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ABSTRACT
This dissertation considers in turn the role education plays in civil, democratic society;
the role assessment plays in education; and the role theoretical constructs and cultural contexts
play in assessment. Then, through literature review, document analysis, and interviews, the
analysis investigates, identifies, and recommends grounded-theory-derived practices for
improving qualitative assessment in higher education settings. The process of qualitative
assessment is understood as being heuristic and continual, requiring re-examination and revision
to maintain both its validity and reliability. To this end, rubrics are essential to efficiently and
reliably assessing everything qualitative, whereas the realities of institutional culture and politics
require adroit leadership from educators and administrators, drawing from manifest praxes in
organizational theory, management theory, and political theory, to affect progressive change.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Assessing learning outcomes is an essential part of establishing both the accountability
for, and the credibility of, the credentialing function of higher education, and as such, evaluations
of instructional effectiveness play a central role in accreditation. From modern critical theory,
higher education in turn may be seen to play a central role in establishing and maintaining
democracy and social justice within civilization (Giroux, 1997). The methodology of learning
assessment shapes the curriculum and pedagogy of education, and thereby shapes — indirectly
— the knowledge base, worldview, and values of society at large (Eisenhower, 1961; Fulbright,
1970; Giroux, 2005). Therefore, the form and function of learning assessment has significant
consequences for the human condition: assessment shapes curriculum, curriculum shapes
education in turn, and finally education shapes society. Thus, what is emphasized in learning
assessment — both in terms of process and outcomes — becomes, for better or worse, what is
emphasized in social structures. These social structures then form a feedback loop reinforcing the
trends in higher education that give rise to them, and, in the present cultural climate, this cycle
may be considered harmful inasmuch as it leads to regressive tendencies in both education and
society (Giroux, 2007).
Since the advent of modern statistical techniques and electronic computers to efficiently
utilize those techniques to analyze data and subsequently mine the results for further analysis,
standardized, normalized, and purely-quantitative methodologies of learning assessment have
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become predominant in educational practice, with non-trivial social consequences (Giroux,
2007). Qualitative assessment methodologies have not enjoyed similar advances in
computational efficiency, and in comparison to quantitative methodologies, remain both more
subjective and more labor-intensive for all participants. This study is intended to identify
qualitative assessment strategies and techniques that have either shown promise toward or have
been demonstrably successful in rectifying this quantitative/qualitative discrepancy of efficiency,
validity, and reliability, and thereby provide recommendations to offset the imbalance between
emphasis on qualitative versus quantitative assessments that is found in current practice in higher
education. By returning meaning and context to a more-central role in learning assessment, a
renewed emphasis upon qualitative perspectives may address many of the perceived
shortcomings that higher education has drawn frequent criticism over in recent years (Hersh &
Merrow, 2005).
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this grounded-theory, multiple-case study is to identify and examine best
practices in qualitative learning assessment in higher education so that generalizable
methodological constructs comparable to validity and reliability in quantitative assessments may
be identified, fostering the transferability of virtuous qualitative assessment techniques to other
postsecondary institutions and their accreditation processes.
This investigation, being grounded in particular contemporary social and educational
theories that drive the need for this research and shape its initial expectations, takes the form of
selected in-depth case studies of programs and institutions recognized as being successful at
qualitative assessment and residing within those theoretical contexts. This study does not attempt
to investigate the theoretically-assumed broader social consequences of successful programs in
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qualitative learning assessment, but does make recommendations for how similar program
effectiveness might be realized at other institutions using either existing programs or evolutions
of them and relying upon the theoretical constructs that subsequently emerge from the research.
Theoretical Contexts and Definitions
The grounding of this study is based upon the synergistic interaction of two theoretical
perspectives, critical theory and constructivist learning, as they may guide qualitative
assessment and as education functions within the present-day socio-political and cultural climate
of the United States.
Critical theory, in its sociological application, is concerned with the dynamics of social
power and the belief systems that enable and result in that power (Giroux, 1990). In particular,
postmodern critical theory examines the relationships between authority and injustice that arise
from capitalism as an economic system, and by extension, a political system. One of the central
ideas of recent critical theory is commodification — the reduction of all values to market-based
ones, and how this reductionism is anti-humanistic. Viewing all human activity through the lens
of the marketplace has dehumanizing consequences — as it considers only extrinsic value at the
expense of intrinsic value — and historically, moral and ethical systems have arisen (or evolved)
to counter — or at least limit — such objectifying perspectives of judgment (Giroux).
Unfortunately for the public welfare, the social and political climate in recent generations
has been subject to a feedback loop of materialism wherein social and cultural capital has
become subjugated to purely economic capital, and the education system has been both a victim
of, and complicit in, this process (Giroux, 1983). Although the causes of this materialist, antihumanist shift may be complex and varied, the necessary participation in and contributions to it
by traditionally-autonomous institutions of higher education is by no means necessary nor
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irreversible. Indeed, it has been noted (Fulbright, 1970) that education is a public good which
should not cede its autonomy to any government; this is the reason, for example, why the U. S.
Constitution (at least in its original adopted and uninterpreted form) does not grant the federal
government any powers over education: public education is intended to serve as a check against
political abuses of power, governmental or otherwise. It is for this reason, again for example, that
American colleges and universities are accredited not by the federal government, but by
relatively-autonomous agencies they themselves have established for the purpose.
To this end, recent initiatives and directives from the federal government exclusively
emphasizing quantitative assessments of learning have been viewed as harmful by many
educators not only because such analyses drive normalization practices that are not respective of
the dignity and worth of individual students qua individuals (Hopmann, 2008), but because
standardized testing paradigms have been viewed as corrupting instruction away from
progressive student-centered models of educational assessment and regressively back toward
discipline-centered ones (Broadhead, 2002). Furthermore, there are systematic issues raised from
the reliance upon quantitative measures to inform policy, inasmuch as anything in the social
sciences that is measured for purposes of control becomes, in response to the exercise of control
through it, itself malleable and less-reliable over time (Goodhart, 1975).
The concern among progressive educators and social critics is that students are becoming
merely well-trained workers in lieu of becoming critical-thinking citizens (who are also capable
of doing work) (Asher, 2009). Industry often decries the lack of critical thinking skills in the
modern workforce, yet it is industry itself that may be seen to drive much of the current trend
away from critical thinking in the pedagogy in favor of standardized — and thus, typically
quantitative — performance testing in learning. Increased calls from outside of academia for
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accountability in higher education must be met by higher education itself, lest other agencies
take it upon themselves to compel accountability in ways of their own choosing (Griffiths,
Vidovich, & Chapman, 2008). Thus, studies such as this one may provide useful insight into
problems many inside higher education might not yet realize we will soon face.
As to education theory specifically, constructivist models of learning emphasize the
emergence of knowledge within the learner, rather than its mere transmission to the learner.
Among contemporary educational theorists, such models of education — based upon imparting
the learner-centric skill of seeking and acquiring knowledge rather than a discipline-centric
database of mere facts — are seen as being more relevant to the increasing complexities of the
modern world (Nussbaum, 2005). These newer, more modern models, however, are more
difficult to assess, as they tend to rely upon subtle processes of information creation and
synthesis within the learner rather than straightforward accumulation and accommodation of
ostensible, sanctioned facts. Creativity, as a particular measure of learning, is not well-suited to
quantitative analysis, as both implicitly and by practical definition originality may not be
standardized (Baker, 2004).
Thus there are both individualized reasons, such as personal excellence and development,
and contextualized reasons, such as the well-being of society at large, to pursue qualitative forms
of learning assessment, but practical opposition from either pragmatic or political forces has been
problematic to that end (Carless, 2005; Nkosana, 2008). The likely-unsolvable conundrum
confronts us: how does one, as an educator, facilitate and then meaningfully assess a student’s
critical thinking skill using a standardized multiple-choice test? In philosophical practice, the
resistance of a question to being answered may often be taken as an indicator that the question is
not well-formed. This study attempts to recapitulate the issue of assessment in such a way that
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educators and policymakers — as well as other stakeholders — may, from the examples and
analyses of emergent theoretical constructs, find helpful methods of qualitatively assessing
learning in reliable and repeatable ways that avoid the negative consequences of purelyquantitative approaches without introducing negative consequences of their own.
Delimitations
As an example of how subjective judgments may be standardized in qualitative
assessments, rubrics linked to learning outcomes are already a familiar tool for modern
educators. The existence of mechanisms such as rubrics suggests that this present research
inquiry has promising precedent: criteria, levels of achievement, and assorted descriptors within
those levels all stand as methodological paradigms, upon which those rubrics are built, limiting
the subjectivity of the assessor. Typically, this subjectivity is further limited by the assessor
making the rubric available not only to the students whose work will be assessed under it, but
also to the overseeing institutional accreditation agency. Accreditors may subsequently compare
and contrast rubrics within and across departments, programs, and institutions pursuant to
institutional assessment processes. Some instructors, under the aegis of academic freedom, may
demonstrate some resistance to committing their judgment processes to paper in the manner of a
rubric, but such habits may be merely reflective of the perpetual tension between academic
freedom and public accountability, and that issue is not germane to this study. What is relevant to
this study is that there is already an explicit acknowledgement among educators that consistent
standards of qualitative assessment are indeed possible, even if the process is still in its early
developmental stages in academe (Carless, 2005; Hopmann, 2008).
In addition, there is a recognized tradition in higher education of writing across the
disciplines as having value in developing critical thinking skills — the rationale being that

6

showing the ability to express an idea in words demonstrates not only mastery of the intellectual
content of the idea itself, but also the successful cognitive integration of that idea with other
concepts in the learner’s worldview (Herrington & Moran, 1992). The problem with assessing
writing, however, is the significant time and labor required — first in the generation of the text
by the student, and then in the evaluation of the text by the instructor. More complex instruments
such as portfolios or live task performances may be even more labor-intensive and timeconsuming.
Preliminary Research Questions
Two avenues of inquiry suggested themselves as starting points for the investigation: 1)
how can the place and function of rubrics in curriculum and pedagogy be examined to yield
practical utilities and theoretical constructs that transcend discipline silos, unique institutional
cultures, and the individual assessors using them, and 2) what practices — technological or
ideological — exist or may be developed to efficiently manage the workload of both students
and instructors engaged in qualitative assessments? Further investigation naturally gives rise to
questions and insights beyond these, as detailed in the methodology and particular case studies
below.
Structure of the Study
This qualitative study is organized conventionally. After this introductory chapter, a brief
literature review chapter is presented. The literature review is not intended to be completely
exhaustive, but provides a broad and diverse survey examining in more detail the various factors
providing the background and context behind the inquiry. Following the literature review,
Chapter 3 explains the study’s methodology in all its assorted aspects, addressing and discussing
the many considerations relevant to a qualitative investigation and the case study format, and
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how this study operates within them from the researcher’s perspective. Subsequent chapters
provide the individual, detailed case studies of programs and institutions purposefully selected
for examination. The final, summary chapter discusses the findings and recommendations of the
study within the context of the issues raised in both this introductory chapter and the individual
case study chapters, again from the researcher’s perspective.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter presents a summary of the literature examining the consequences of,
methods for, and purposes behind recent changes in the policy and theory of liberal, public
education as the foundation of a democratic society. In this context, constructivist educational
theory is a long-standing area of research interest in the philosophy of education dating at least as
far back as the early 20th Century and the work of John Dewey, but its roots may be seen in the
writings of 19th Century thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and even 18th Century thinkers
such as Thomas Jefferson. This review summarizes both the theoretical dynamic within which
education may be viewed as an ontological-sociological technology as well as the unavoidable
political elements which arise from the structure of that dynamic and to which education is thus
subjected, for better or worse, in the contemporary cultural environment. This historical and
philosophical framework may then form the basis of the case studies and “best practices”
analyses and recommendations that follow.
The review of literature is presented as follows. First, an historical overview of the
controversy surrounding the publication of The Bell Curve is summarized, to provide a
background for the resulting problem of dehumanizing standardization. Second, the technology
of education from the theories of John Dewey is examined in its historical context to provide the
humanistic foundation for modern educational theory and educational reform. Third, from the
more-recent writings of Michel Foucault, the concept of the learning apparatus is analyzed and
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developed for application to the problems modern, progressive educational theory faces. Fourth,
using recent and less-recent research, the architecture of control is discussed for both an
explanation of its evolution and function, and to show how the goals of education were shifted in
the middle of the last century away from their traditionally humanistic purpose. Fifth, the
dehumanizing consequences of overly-quantified assessment practices and perspectives are
examined and considered harmful, as foreseen by some researchers.
The Origin and Context of the Problem: Social Darwinism and Sorting
The publication, and widespread exposure, of The Bell Curve text (Herrnstein & Murray,
1994) has established itself as a watershed event in the history of educational theory, for reasons
its authors may well have intended (Fendler & Muzaffar, 2008). The Gaussian distribution — the
shape of which has often been interpreted as bell-like — is a mathematical model of probability
with its own well-established history as a data-derived phenomenon in both the physical and
behavioral sciences (Stigler, 1986). However, this model has been extended, largely due to the
influence of The Bell Curve on public policy decision-making, from a descriptive model resultant
from objective analysis into a subjective, normative model used — or arguably misused — for
prediction and the accumulation and exercise of social power and control (Fendler & Muzaffar;
Steele & Aronson, 1995).
The “bell curve” is a form of quantitative assessment; in the original presentation,
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) specifically applied the model to intelligence quotient (IQ) testing,
and found significant correlations between IQ and race and socio-economic status. The authors
then used these correlations to — inappropriately without controlled experimentation — not
merely hypothesize, but genuinely posit, the existence of a causal agency, which they identified
as being genetic, and therefore racial, in origin (Fendler & Muzaffar, 2008). Although the
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explicit racism of this methodologically-questionable finding drew much subsequent criticism
and defense of its particular “biological determinism” conclusions (Gould, 1996; Murray, 1995),
the general appropriateness of normative, quantitative assessment practices in the behavioral
sciences became essentially unassailable as a result of the debate. This outcome was because
although the particular application of statistical modeling to IQ distribution in the general
population was subsequently examined for flaws in the research design, the validity of the
mathematical technique was generally accepted by both sides of the debate (Gardner, 1995).
Such debate, which continues through the present day, centers on the reflexive and subjective
nature of the reified theoretical constructs of “race” (Smedley, 1998) and “intelligence” (Neisser
& Boodoo, 1996), and thus their ultimate meaninglessness and uselessness as objectiveanalytical tools. The validity of such analysis overall when applied to the inherently at-leastpartially-subjective-and-therefore-arguably-non-scientific phenomenon of human behavior,
however, has not been examined with as much rigor or vigor (Plucker, 2003). The scientific
method has certainly established its utility in advancing the understanding of human behavior,
but given the aforementioned subjectivity, it is naïve — even willfully so — to presuppose
quantitative methods alone will be sufficient to the task. Scientific methods are only as good as
the epistemologies and ontologies upon which they are erected, and it is necessary to call upon
the qualitative from time to time to give meaning to measurement.
For the present consideration, the point is that the application of normal probability
distribution (NPD) assumptions to quantitative assessments at all levels of education is
ultimately a regressive, rather than a progressive, process (Fendler & Muzaffar, 2008), and this
process is often deliberately intended to advance a particular political agenda regarding society
(Murray, 2007). Furthermore, there is a methodological and logical fallacy involved in the
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circular reasoning behind the numerical definition of a normalized standard to fit to observed
data and then the assertion that the measurement of that standard represents some instance of an
actual phenomenon naturally occurring in the population; there is no such thing in the field as an
“average” person, since “average” is a mathematical construct, not a natural entity. Therefore,
applying the bell curve model to outcome assessment — learning assessment in particular —
generates a phenomenological ontology regarding an emergent entity who is conceptualized as
the Average Student (Fendler & Muzaffar). This categorization, and the sorting schema it
subsequently inspires, does not necessarily represent an actual, natural state of affairs in the
population, but is merely a self-serving artifact of the way the analysis is structured. Although
the resulting tendency toward sorting within the educational system has often been considered
unwelcome, arguments against sorting have remained historically ineffective, primarily due to
the influence of politics on the policy process (Hacking, 1990, 2002).
The Technology of Education
The notion of progressive education has its origins in the early 20th Century writings of
pragmatist philosopher and philosopher of education John Dewey. The theory emerges as an
extension of the traditional notion of a liberal education (as promoted by Thomas Jefferson, for
example) into a constructivist model wherein both the individual and society develop in a
mutually-reinforcing teleological process of increasing complexity and excellence, and hence,
“progress” (Dewey, 1900, 1916). In such a scenario, the interdependent thriving of both the
society and the individual operates in a scientific and moral way — a “technology” — to insure
the well-being of both; this synergistic coupling represents the ultimate expression of democracy,
as idealized by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle.
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Central to this growth process is the emphasis that should be placed upon a student’s
problem-solving skills; in addition to the basic social skills of learning to live and work
cooperatively with others, schools should place the emphasis on developing the student’s
judgment rather than mere knowledge, as this is today, perhaps even more so than a century ago,
the key skill individuals need to flourish in an increasingly-complex society. It is Dewey’s
position that assessment should be based on an individualized metric (judgment) rather than an
objective, normalized one (knowledge), and little well-supported rebuttal of this point — much
less refutation — has been forthcoming in the decades since it was first made.
The Apparatus of Learning
Learning itself constitutes a form of governance. Historically, modern educational theory
examines the two environmental contexts within which the learner learns (Lewis, 2007). After
Dewey, the process of learning can be viewed as occurring in a state of tension between the
developing autonomy and self-realization of the student, and the authority of family and the state
that impose formal education upon the pupil. This dichotomy recapitulates, on the personal scale,
the larger power dynamic of (all) society wherein a dialectic between individual autonomy and
public authority is constantly playing out. The writings of Michel Foucault (1972, 1994) explore
and develop this general sociological process in much more detail; the key conclusion is that
standardization — whether it is in curriculum, or pedagogy, or assessment — represents an
attempt to assert sovereign control through the mechanism of instruction. At times, this process
may even be characterized as a form of indoctrination, especially in circumstances where a
particular educational system is designed and implemented to strengthen authority at the expense
of autonomy (Mason, 2008; Piro, 2008).
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In contrast, modern educational principles such as “life-long learning” and “critical
thinking” are considered valuable tools — and in combination, an apparatus — for increasing the
power and autonomy of the individual as a member of (an implicitly democratic) society (Lewis,
2007; Simons & Masschelein, 2008). This individual empowerment may in turn form the basis
of a general social empowerment — after Foucault — which may then shift authority away from
oligarchic models of governance and onto the populace directly through the accumulation of
socio-economic capital. Most saliently, this capital is generated by the learning process itself,
rather than any particular learning outcome, and is therefore more qualitative than quantitative in
nature. Naturally, authoritarian governments seek to inhibit or prevent the accumulation of much
of this capital by the public in order to preserve the concentration of power in the structures of
governmental authority and thereby perpetuate and increase that authority.
As suggested above, the best and most-confirmed path to the manifestation of an
Aristotelian/Jeffersonian utopian democracy is found in the technology of education set forth by
John Dewey (Margonis, 2009). The inculcation of autonomous values, rather than the
indoctrination of authoritarian ones, is the defining, crucial “technology” involved in progressive
education, and therefore the growth and development, of the individual learner. This process then
fosters the principle of self-governance under which both the individual student and the
“multitude” of a public comprised of such individuals operate. Ultimately, education, and the
form its practical components and practices take, may be conceived of as the defining and
controlling factor in what form of governance the society operationalizes overall. In as many
words, education is governance — of both the individual and the society (Piro, 2008). Control of
education ultimately yields control of government, and, more crucially, vice-versa.
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The Architecture of Control
The natural mechanisms of governance drive governing systems toward authoritarianism
(Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009), and contemporary developments in information/instructional
technology and realpolitik are driving new challenges to progressive education as authoritarian
control becomes easier to exercise and more generally-accepted politically (Masschelein, 2004).
History demonstrates that the consolidation of power drives the further consolidation of power
(Nietzsche, 1887); this is the reason that the dispersal and sharing of power as widely as possible
— through some democratic system of government — is considered the best defense against
tyranny. Although fully-democratic societies have their own problems of “groupthink” and its
like, they are still considered preferable to the regressive dehumanization that inevitably results
from tyranny placing the preservation of state power and control ahead of individual flourishing
(Piro, 2008).
Conversely, for government — even and especially a progressive, democratic one — the
main challenge in the exercise of its authority is striking a balance between individual and
general welfare (Simons & Masschelein, 2006, 2008). This is further complicated by
uncertainties among theorists within the education profession as to how best to address these
issues (Masschelein & Quaghebeur, 2005), or even if they should be addressed in the current
political climate (Depaepe, 2007).
Another obstacle to progressive educational reform in service to the advancement of
democratic governance lies in the fact that systematic, methodical attempts to promote
democracy and democratic principles in curriculum and pedagogy are largely ineffective in the
face of economic pressures and institutional (government) power as individuals — particularly as
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capitalism has spread around the world — become preoccupied with fundamental, personal
economic needs in place of broader cultural ones (Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009).
Together, all these factors combine to create an already-significant advantage for
institutional power to maintain its authority and control, but a new mechanism has been deployed
to further enhance that advantage: ideology shifts through language shifts (Helfenbein & Shudak,
2009). Contemporary developments in mass-media technology have allowed public discourse to
be controlled and shaped in historically-unprecedented ways, and as a consequence, the
ontologies that individuals devise to understand the modern world are heavily-influenced and
biased in favor of the controlling agencies from the outset.
Modern media permits propagandizing on a level and to an extent never before seen in
human culture, and ideologues have rushed to embrace its use for explicitly political purposes
(Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009). Thus, modern political discourse is shaped not by the populace,
but instead by those who own and thereby control the mass media, and the interests of such
controlling entities overwhelmingly trend toward the authoritarian. As a consequence of this, in
turn, the very terminology and vernacular surrounding democracy and the public good has been
altered to conform more closely to specific regressive values; “democracy” is now defined as
“choosing leaders” (who must then be dutifully followed) and “free markets” are the antidote to
the undesirable “socialism” which would annihilate them. And yet, “democracy” is much more
than picking and then obeying pre-approved candidates in a representative republic, whereas
“free markets” are little more than an unfettered embrace of the latent merciless, anti-social,
greed-based hostilities of a competitive economy in lieu of showing a little compassion and
charity toward one’s fellow human beings. Such thought-provoking perspectives are not taught
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in present-day schools, by design, and thus real power is kept out of the hands of the governed
(Popkewitz, 1996).
Whereas the primary and secondary school systems are perhaps more beholden to
government oversight and control, higher education will need to take the lead on the rectification
of this problem (Popkewitz, 1996). Higher education is (at least for now) subject to less
legislative and regulatory restriction (cf. “academic freedom,” etc.), as well as serving as the
primary clearinghouse for the certification of education professionals — teachers and
administrators — for the public school system. It therefore falls especially heavily upon higher
education academics to confront and redress the need for corrective policymaking at all levels of
the educational system, not only by research and study of the problem, but also by first and
simply raising awareness, both inside and outside of the profession, of the very existence of the
problem in the first place (Helfenbein & Shudak, 2009).
That the governed – either the general citizenry or the professoriate, as the case may be –
acquiesce to this is a direct consequence of their systematic dehumanization in the authoritariancontrolled educational system — they implicitly accept a regressive worldview as natural, and
even desirable, and subsequently fail to actualize their own potential excellences. From the
perspective of educators and the philosophy of education, this may be viewed as an unethical
practice on the part of both the society and the individual.
Dehumanizing Consequences
Excessive reliance upon standardized outcome assessment methods may be — in the
vernacular of systems analysis and best practices — “considered harmful” (Wallace & Graves,
1995). One of the most insidious consequences of standardized assessments is the normalization
of failure. Standardized assessments are inevitably calibrated — or “curved,” to use common
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terminology belying the Gaussian origins of the practice — not only to generate a “normal” level
of performance around which the majority of “non-deviating” students are clustered in the results
of the analysis, but also to insure a pre-determined percentage of students have performance
metrics low-enough to be considered “failures” at whatever the assessment is designed (or less
charitably, in the case of quantities such as IQ, “purported”) to measure.
This practice then engenders an “acceptable” number of resultant failures, and such are
perceived as an inevitable and unavoidable natural consequence of whatever humanistic process,
such as education, has been subject to the assessment (Wallace & Graves, 1995). It should not be
overlooked that “free market” ideology itself furthers and perpetuates this inescapable
consequence of competition: The existence of “winners” is predicated upon the existence of
“losers” to provide context, yet this process, though arguably natural (cf. “The Law of the
Jungle” and so on), is neither necessary for nor appropriate to the existence of an allegedlycivilized social species such as mankind.
In education per se, there are two distinct, but related problems with this (Thayer-Bacon,
2008). Although the accommodation of outliers performing significantly above “average” is
often haphazard within educational systems, it is not as urgently needed, as such individuals tend
to self-actualize on their own initiative regardless of environmental aids or hindrances, building
self-governance models out of whatever is available. For educators, the primary challenge facing
these “gifted” individuals is the outward socialization, into a democratic practice, of the
principles of self-governance in worldview. Without adequate guidance and context, “gifted”
individuals can fall under the influence of competitive, regressive values systems, and never
aspire beyond self-centered merely-libertarian perspectives into a full actualization of the
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principle of “liberty” as “liberty for all” within the context of a mutually-respectful social
structure.
More problematically, the accommodation of outliers performing significantly below
“average” is practically non-existent within the mechanisms of governance in contemporary
society. Recently, the mass media have been beset with widespread editorializing calls for policy
reform in both the social and educational systems because those systems have been producing
individuals prone to expressing their personal frustrations and failures through fatally-destructive
acts of public violence against innocent fellow members of their communities; be they family
members, friends, or strangers, such victims represent targets of opportunity for the dehumanized
“loser” since the real instruments of oppression are too abstract and too powerful for the lone
(i.e., improperly socialized as a result of regressive social practices) individual to oppose
directly. Again, the debate is being shaped by the mass media to serve the interests of the
controlling governance; the editorializing is often long on blame and short on plausible, practical
remedies, largely from the deliberate avoidance of engaging with the real issue: the systematic
depersonalization and dehumanization that has become the accepted status quo of modern
society. Until the roots of the problem are brought to light — in and through educational reform
— social reform, no matter how strongly needed, will simply not be possible (Giroux, 2007).
Such reform, however, is not without its own challenges (Rose, 1996). The lack of
centralized mechanisms of control make governance of less-authoritarian models — be they in
education or society — much more complex undertakings, and ones which require constant
adjustment and self-assessment. In practical terms, this makes them less efficient to administrate
and operate, but it may be noted prosaically that this is the price of progress, and that the
flourishing and added value such practices bring to both the resulting societies and the
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individuals whose lives and works make up those societies combine to make the undertaking
worthwhile.
Summary and Perspective
From my training as a philosopher and my experience as an educator I have evolved an
admittedly-progressive conceptual framework over the years to contextualize the relationship
between education and society. Analysis of this conceptual framework itself then gives rise to a
practical framework informing my career goals and educational philosophy.
Within my conceptual framework, I have evolved an epistemological framework best
characterized by the works of Michel Foucault (1972, 1994) and Paulo Freire (2006). These two
post-Marxist theoreticians are outspoken critics of repressive social orders, and Freire in
particular is a pioneer of critical pedagogy, a complex educational movement intended to
promote critical thinking and social justice. Critical pedagogy invites students to examine
notions such as social space and the resulting genesis of (social) classes (Bourdieu, 1977), and
how social power dynamics shape and determine society (Arendt, 1998).
Philosopher John Searle (1990) has suggested, especially in critique of Harold Bloom
(and perhaps of the late Howard Zinn as well), that the purpose of critical pedagogy is ultimately
to create political radicals. From my perspective since the turn of the millennium, given the
current social and educational climate as routinely reported in the mass media and trade press,
the intended pejorative quality of this admonition is less than persuasive. The history of human
civilization finds political radicals at the fulcrum of many of its turning points, and this is as
often as not a valuable and beneficial thing – as it often leads to progress. Arguments against
progress — no matter what their provenance — are inevitably flawed, being self-serving and/or
oppressive (Nietzsche, 1887).
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A central tenet of critical pedagogy is the properly-liberating quality of education and the
consequent/concomitant benefits to the student and society, hence the traditional appellation
“liberal education.” The dimensions and degrees of this liberation are defined but not delimited
by the accompanying theoretical framework I have erected for myself upon the aforementioned
works of John Dewey (1900, 1916) and Henry A. Giroux (1983, 1990, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2007).
Yet — as critical pedagogy itself will attest — theory is of only academic use without an
accompanying praxis, and therefore in recent years I have become aware of the need to evolve a
practical framework for the advancement of education along liberating, rather than oppressing,
conceptual lines.
I have identified qualitative assessment methodologies as being acutely wanting and
neglected in this regard, as they, by nature, appear to me to tend to empower students and
educators rather than institutions of top-down control. My research into qualitative assessment,
initially begun out of merely professional interest in improving my own teaching, has grown to
become the cornerstone of my entire pedagogical and philosophical outlook toward education.
The occasion of writing my doctoral dissertation provides an excellent opportunity to
explore remediative technologies (to borrow vernacular from Dewey) to facilitate the process of
progressive educational reform — specifically in line with the problematic trends observed in
higher education at present. Both in the literature and out in the field, I have begun to morefrequently encounter lamentations of the increasingly-dire state of education; more and more it
seems that everyone is calling for something to be done, but few workable solutions are being
offered, short of those that transfer more control of education out of the hands of academe and
the publis and into the hands of self-serving institutions of not-directly-accountable economicsocial-political power.
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Although it would be presumptive to expect this investigation to yield a wondrous
panacea for the problem, it is my intention that by addressing what I perceive to be a serious
omission — either from deliberate, political design or intellectual fatigue and inertia — in the
understanding of good educational practice, I may at least gain personal insight into a promising
path for educational reform. Whereas it is explicitly not my intention to generate a harsh polemic
in this dissertation, it is my explicit intention to construct recommendations and suggest a
constructive course of action. If, as William Butler Yates famously stated, “Education is not
filling a bucket, but lighting a fire,” I note that such fires may be effectively kindled not only in
the minds of students, but also in the minds of their teachers, administrators, and public officials.
Best Practices
In the next chapter, a methodology will be developed to establish the parameters of best
practices in assessment reform through case studies and applied systems analysis of qualitative
assessment. A special emphasis will be placed on the progressive and ethical considerations of
increasing reliance upon qualitative assessment methods and rubrics as technologies to serve
educational reform better than a purely quantitative, standardized apparatus can.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
General Considerations
This chapter presents and discusses the methodological considerations of case study
research both in general and as specifically applied to this research task. As such, it starts from a
philosophical perspective, elaborates into practical issues, and concludes with a mixture of the
two. Subsequent chapters consist of the evidence and analysis, concluding with an overall
discussion of the findings and their implications within the framework set out here below.
During the course of a grounded-theory research project such as this study pursues, the
methodology may naturally evolve. As my investigation unfolded, the initial, expected emphasis
on case study and interview methodology originally proposed below necessarily shifted to an
investigation based primarily on document analysis and, due to the poor condition in which some
of the documents were found, I ended up developing a more informal coding scheme than the
one I had originally envisioned using. These specific changes are further detailed in an
addendum to this chapter.
Philosophical Assumptions
The philosophical school of positivism informs both educational and grounded-theory,
case-study research (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2006). Positivism centers on the essential knowability of
reality and has been highly instrumental in shaping the modern scientific worldview; it carries
with it its own methodological strengths and weaknesses, however. Based upon reasoned
epistemological conclusions about the possibility and obtainability of empirical knowledge,

23

positivism, if relied upon uncritically, can lead to unwarranted assertions of certainty (Popper,
1959). This in itself forms an underlying theme of the preceding chapters: data may be
misconstrued as facts, and quantified constructs may be reified out-of-context and thus
harmfully. All investigations pursuing a grounded theory strategy — wherein theoretical
constructs are typically emergent from the researcher’s consideration of the data — would
therefore likewise be well advised to adhere to Occam’s Razor (also popularly known since
Occam’s day as The Principle of Parsimony, from the original Latin lex parsimoniae) and not
multiply entities beyond necessity when theorizing or interpreting, and the present research must
be no exception to this — arguably an original best — practice.
Phenomenology in internal context. The discrete phenomenon taken under study herein
is effective qualitative assessment, where “effective” is used here to mean some forms of
objective validity and reliability result from the particular practice. Furthermore, within this type
of grounded-theory research, a case is a discrete and particular instance of the phenomena under
examination (Gall et al., 2006): here, a program, instrument, or practice of student learning
assessment (a) at an accredited postsecondary educational institution; (b) that relies
fundamentally upon a qualitative perspective rather than a quantitative one; and (c) has itself
been the subject of expert evaluation prior to this study.
The units of analysis for the study are emergent from the particular cases, and naturally
evolve into a coding scheme as a dynamic part of the investigation. Similarly, the focus of the
study is also emergent from the basic notion of “outcome.”
One of the primary research goals in this study is the evolution of a coding scheme that
will facilitate a subsequent (later-study) factor analysis of the emergent factors characterizing
qualitative instruments such as rubrics. It is the researcher’s intent that this study may form a
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pilot from which quantitative interpretations of relevant qualia may in turn be drawn, to lend an
appreciable aspect of measurability to the employed qualitative instrumentation.
Phenomenology in external context. As the nature of the task is interpretive, the role of
the researcher in qualitative research is inextricably linked to the research itself, given the
inherently subjective nature of the mode of inquiry (Patton, 2002). Therefore, within this type of
study especially, explicit attention must be paid to discriminate the etic perspective of the
researcher from the emic perspectives of the participants and subjects. Given that the researcher
may be presumed to share a command background and interest with many of those whose work
forms the object of the study, the differences in these perspectives may be subtle, and perhaps
even irrelevant to the basic details of the investigation. In the summary phase of this research,
however, the distinction is non-trivial, and is duly noted as necessary.
In the interests of necessary full disclosure, I again acknowledge a proprietary concern in
matters of educational practice as they exist within the larger socio-cultural context in which
education and educational systems function. It is my intention that by drawing a clear distinction
between the political and social concerns motivating the research interest on a personal and
philosophical level and the actual data that may be obtained, a more scientifically-objective
framework may be established for the evaluation of qualitative assessment practices in and of
themselves. As indicated in the previous chapter, I make no secret of the intended significance
and relevance of this study, but — as per Occam — I must restrict interpretation of the findings
to only what is demonstrably in evidence from the data and its analysis; researcher selfawareness is necessary to temper any excessive subjectivity to the interpretation of the findings
and their meanings. This will be further addressed in the analysis and conclusions in the final
chapter.
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Role of the Researcher
Peshkin (2000) characterizes the issue succinctly, “The essence of case study design is
interpretation” (p. 7). From this, four parameters of interpretation may be identified within the
case study format: (a) where the researcher looks; (b) what data is collected; (c) what data is
analyzed; and (d) what meaning may be gleaned from the analysis.
Where the researcher looks in case study research is usually informed by convenience
and snowball sampling, and the present research is no exception. Methods such as rubrics and
writing programs were chosen as initial points of investigation precisely because I was already
familiar with the basics of rubrics as an instrument and written evaluations as a process, and had
ready access to background information on recent developments in the theories and practices of
each as well as a basic conceptual familiarity from which to outline a preliminary coding
scheme. Further cases then develop as an outgrowth of these lines of inquiry, as well as any new
lines of inquiry that present themselves to the opportunistic, seeking researcher as the
investigation develops. For example, my initial interest in rubrics, sparked from casual
conversation with an instructor colleague, led me to identify an educator with experience in the
successful application of rubrics to writing. That individual also pointed me toward recent
innovations in peer-review systems of writing assessment, where I identified two other educators
with experience and contacts in that technology. All of these individual educators were then
approached about the possibility of being research subjects in a dissertation project, and they not
only expressed interest, but also subsequently suggested other individuals and programs for the
researcher to investigate. Combined with the lack of specific literature on the matter, this wordof-mouth process quickly convinced me of both the feasibility of, and the acute need for, this
study.
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It should be noted at this point that in educational research of this type, assessment of
processes is at least as important as assessment of outcomes (Whitson, 1998); the two may be
considered inexorably intertwined, and in this study are appropriately evaluated as such.
In most forms of qualitative social sciences research the scope and extent of the data that
is collected typically exceeds the scope and extent of the data that is actually analyzed; this can
be problematic if the researcher eliminates from consideration — either through accident or
design — data that may hold relevance to the inquiry (Creswell, 2009). For this reason, case
studies such as this one require review and evaluation from peers and experts at all stages of data
handling, to ensure that relevant data — or relationships within the data — are not overlooked by
even the most self-aware of researchers. In addition, such external quality control is necessary to
establish and maintain a level of trustworthiness in the researcher, lest objectivity become
compromised from the collapse of etic-emic distance.
Finally, the ultimate interpretation of the data is subject to immeasurable bias from the
researcher’s own etic perspective, and again, ongoing appraisal from peers and experts can
identify and ameliorate this factor beyond what even the most self-conscious researcher may
achieve acting only independently, even in light of full disclosure.
Overall, I am informed from a philosophical background that looks to Immanuel Kant
and Aristotle for ethics, and to Plato, Kant, and John Dewey for epistemology. I am particularly
influenced by the aspect of Kant’s Categorical Imperative that morally requires each person to
ever be considered as an end, and never merely as a means to an end. This is combined with
Aristotelian notions of an internal entelechy (loosely, intellect) in all things driving and directing
each of them toward the virtuous expression of their particular telos (loosely, meaningful
purpose).
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I recognize that these elements are inherently present in all students, engendering a
Kantian socio-ethical obligation among civilized peoples to not dehumanize students by reducing
them to mere cold, alienated statistics for some practical purpose, nor to unethically obstruct the
Aristotelian actualization of the unique potentials within the student. The onus is upon educators
to facilitate the excellence of each and every student; as discussed above, quantitative
assessments contribute little to this underlying moral purpose of education, and may even
obstruct it when misused (either by accident or design).
As regards epistemology, I hold a position that acknowledges the universal nature of the
objects of knowledge — consistent with Platonism — but, transcending Platonism in the
tradition of Dewey, recognizes that knowledge must be individually constructed by each learner,
rather than merely recognized as some instance of a divine absolute (a Platonic aeon —
traditionally translated as Form — as it were). To this process I also add the Kantian perspective
that although all knowledge bears this subjective character, the underlying framework upon
which knowledge is constructed has a universal consistency (Kant’s categories of the
understanding) that renders some measure of coherence to its resultant understandings — this
leads to the aforementioned positivism underlying the scientific method, for instance. (Positivism
has delimitations of its own, as any philosopher of science will attest, but they are beyond the
scope of this present work, and positivism remains a cornerstone of educational research
regardless.)
Similarly, this positivist, constructivist perspective has convinced me that, although the
process may be unclear at the outset, the research questions pursued in this study are, in both
theory and practice, answerable. Furthermore, the ethical concerns raised in my mind regarding
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the proliferation of quantitative methods as the preferred basis of educational policymaking
effectively require me to address them publicly.
Strategies and Procedures for Data Collection and Analysis
Presentation of the data in the case studies is guided by three processes within the data
collection and assimilation itself: description, explanation, and evaluation (Gall et al., 2006).
Description. The bulk of the case studies consists of thick descriptions of the
phenomenon (or phenomena) (Gall et al., 2006; Patton, 2002). Herein, it is primarily comprised
of a detailed exegesis of the history and systems involved in a case, and is typically fairly
extensive. From this observation and critical evaluation, salient constructs are inferentially
emergent to the researcher; these constructs are then conceptualized and grouped according to
their coding — again by the researcher — into themes that define the relevance of the case to the
research questions. The data collection for this case study research involves a combination of
(typically public) document analysis — in the form of reports, rubrics, policies, and such — and
personal communications — in the form of correspondences and interviews as necessary to
elaborate on the written record and themselves documented in turn within the written record of
this report. In any sound, rigorous qualitative study, all details of data collection must be
preserved in such as way to be auditable by the current researcher or future researchers.
Publicly-available documents do not require much in the way of consent or approval;
they are available in libraries, over the Internet, and sometimes even by personal request from
scholarly researchers. Within this study, it is the correspondence and/or interview process that
particularly needs IRB scrutiny to protect the educator/assessor subjects. As part of the process
of rich data collection, individuals being corresponded with or interviewed may provide, either
from prompting or on their own initiative, information from a perspective or in a capacity that is
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personal, rather than public-professional — I encountered this phenomenon in casual, collegial
conversation with colleagues even before the study formally began, and consider it to be at least
as valuable and informative as “on the record” speech from an official capacity.
Although the direct incorporation of such informal data into the study and analysis may
be problematic, it certainly may be used to inform the developing, “on the record” lines of
inquiry. Therefore, a fairly comprehensive consent form, attached as an appendix to this
document, has been provided to guarantee informed consent and thereby protect subjects
engaging in dialog with the researcher as part of data collection. As there are only a few preset
interview questions to be used across the various studies, where consented to and where
especially relevant or salient, member-checked edited transcripts of all relevant and/or referenced
interviews and correspondences are attached as appendices to this manuscript to further
document for the reader the context and background of anything cited in a given case study.
In special cases and where specifically requested, individuals, institutions, and/or
programs are anonymized for subjects’ protection; pseudonyms are used as necessary and
identifying information in the original records is kept only in a “military-grade” encrypted and
hash-signed file on the researcher’s own computer system (including archives), with the
researcher having sole knowledge of the decryption passcode. In general, however, there is a
large degree of transparency in the formal data collection of this particular study, as the data
tends to come from publicly-identifiable individuals and programs; this promotes the overall
credibility and trustworthiness of the research findings.
As to the applied methodology, the key component of the research process herein centers
around the coding of the data, after collection, into a meaningful scheme. This process,
conducted upon data shortly after it is collected from each source, results in a triangulation
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dynamic that can direct subsequent data collection. For this study, there are no explicit
preconceptions about of what the data will consist (as mentioned, there are only a few specific,
pre-written interview questions at the outset, for example), and therefore it is incumbent upon me
to “bootstrap” the research questions for each step of the investigation out of the data from the
previous step. The research begins from a handful of salient areas of interest, but the path of the
investigation is driven by the data as they are encountered. The unpredictability of this process
requires me to maintain flexibility when approaching the data, and can cause interpretations of
the data to periodically need re-evaluation. This re-evaluation can even extend to the theoretical
framework — critical theory and constructivism — driving the research to begin with, and again,
as an investigator, I must not be a prisoner of my own ethnography. A good scientist has no
unchallengeable axioms. (For the pedantic reader: note that this statement is a logical truth, not
an empirical one.)
This stage of each case presentation favors a narrative voice, to present the context in the
most compelling and engaging manner — that of a story (Patton, 2002). Again, the personal
perspective and unique ethnography of the researcher inevitably informs and shapes this story,
but a journalistic tone should be maintained — at least until the concluding chapter. I
acknowledge — consistent with Plato’s contempt for the arts — the fact that compelling stories
are in and of themselves not logical proofs or even rational arguments per se, but as there can be
no meaning with at least a modicum of engagement — a point to which Plato would grudgingly
agree — evoking empathy in the audience is not an inappropriate strategy when attempting to
demonstrate the power and utility of qualitative practices.
Explanation. Two types of patterns emerge from themes: relational patterns and causal
patterns. As this research is looking to characterize best practices, from the theoretical
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perspective, causal patterns are more significant and relevant to the overall goal of
generalizability, but from the practical perspective, relational patterns can be more robust and
ultimately useful. Systematic relations between constructs and themes are explored to establish
plausible effective links from one to the other, and these links are themselves grounded within
the context established from description. The validity and reliability of the research rest largely
on the quality of this analysis, and a technique of constant comparison within the emergent
constructs must be employed to assure relevance and reliability, even if such are only evident ex
post facto (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and triangulation processes further strengthen these.
This stage of the case presentation shifts to, and remains in, an analytic voice, to drive a
more objective mode of explanatory understanding (Gall et al., 2006). Value judgments, being
themselves judgments of meaning, are more properly reserved for the concluding chapter and its
evaluation of the data and analysis.
Evaluation. The finishing process of each case involves the integration of the findings
into the goals and conceptual framework of the research question. At the conclusion of the
overall study, a second level of evaluative, critical analysis further extends and generalizes this
process across all the reported research through a mechanism of triangulation (Gall et al., 2006).
It is at this point that the researcher returns to narrative voice, the extraction of meaning from the
data being framed in terms of the researcher’s theoretical perspective and goals. It has often been
said that all observations are theory-dependent, and even grounded-theory research is not
immune to this fact.
Validating the Findings
From the positivist perspective, then, identification of emergent themes is the primary
indicator of validity in this study (Gall et al., 2006; Patton, 2002). Central to the research
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question is how best practices emerge; the lack of a readily-available definition of such a
construct as “best practices” itself is a significant lacuna this research is intended to address.
The specific findings are validated in terms of transferability and generalizability. The
former is the more positivist undertaking, as post facto analyses can reveal the obstacles and
successes within individual cases that delimit them, and thereby establish construct validity (Gall
et al., 2006). The later is the more-artful and less-scientific task, but is still approachable
systematically (Patton, 2002). One of the guiding principles of the explanatory phase of data
analysis is to frame constructs within contexts that are themselves well-defined and wellunderstood, to facilitate transferability of the constructs to other contexts. From this internal
validity, an external validity is then be reasonably extrapolated — in the case of qualitative
research, this manifests specifically as the trustworthiness and credibility of the study. Finally,
reliability is difficult to establish from a single, essentially pilot, research project of this scope,
but within the construct of best practices, a quality of repeatability is inherently sought,
providing guidelines extracted from the valid constructs and themes to allow the same (or
similar) instruments, programs, and/or pedagogies to be implemented in other postsecondary
educational contexts, and perhaps beyond.
Ethical Issues
The ethical dimension of this study is threefold. First, confidentiality regarding the
individual students whose assessment occurred under the programs investigated in this study
should not be difficult to preserve. Any publicly-available reports or program evaluations, for
example, appearing as data in a case herein have typically already passed through Institutional
Review Board approval processes at their originating institutions, and may already be
collectively anonymized for public release.
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Second, as discussed above, the identities of individuals providing personal accounts of
qualitative assessment practices may sometimes require protecting, depending on particular
circumstances and preferences. Many participants in qualitative research welcome the
opportunity to tell their stories (as in Patton above), but many others have reasons to conceal
their identities, the identities of their institutions, and perhaps even the identities of the
phenomena under study (the program names, for example). Allowances must be made for both
those willing to be identified and those reluctant to be identified, and each must be referenced
appropriately, specific waivers obtained as required, and so forth. It must always be borne in
mind that individuals reluctant to openly participate in research may have some of the most
relevant and interesting data to offer (Patton, 2002). To reiterate, this is the area most-typically
requiring IRB scrutiny to protect the research subjects — the educators and assessors who may
or may not be speaking in a public capacity and thereby enjoy the benefits of academic freedom.
Lastly is the issue of the purpose and nature of this research itself, which is driven by
critical-theory-based concerns regarding the ethics of current trends in assessment practices and
the consequences of such trends upon education and society at large. As this viewpoint has been
openly addressed in the early chapters of this report, full disclosure by the researcher has been
duly established, and shall be maintained, as the etic and emic perspectives are explored.
Summary
To facilitate coding and analysis, I have chosen to use the open-source Text Analysis
Markup System and its associated TAMSAnalyzer software.1 TAMS produces machine-andhuman-readable text-based coding and analysis, and also can be used to indirectly annotate
1

The source code, documentation, and compiled applications are downloadable from

http://tamsys.sourceforge.net/
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audio-visual media. As my investigation concentrates primarily on document analysis and
interviews, this tool allows me to freely cross-reference and analyze any and all significant terms
or themes I identify regardless of the source media. The software is capable of tracking
numerous emergent themes across large numbers of coded data points, and thereby fosters not
only analysis of the data, but meta-analysis of the analysis itself. The TAMSAnalyzer software
package also produces output in a format suitable for displaying graphically, as may be useful.
The dynamic process of coding and analysis forms the basis of my investigation, and
shapes my emergent theories and research questions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, my goal is
twofold: I am seeking to establish some objective, practical guidelines for the successful
employment of qualitative assessment techniques (in higher education specifically, but hopefully
generalizable beyond that realm) as well as identify specific qualitatively-based assessment
practices that by extension preserve and promote the general purposes of liberal education.
To this end, I am seeking to evolve coding schema not only with an eye toward devising
specific practical recommendations to facilitate higher efficiency in and wider adoption of
qualitative assessment methodologies in the face of comparable quantitative assessment
instruments, policies, and programs, but also with an eye toward identifying themes and
outcomes that have relevance to the socio-political theories motivating my research from the
broader perspective.
It is my intent that this research may serve as the foundation for further, subsequent
research to extend these preliminary findings, eventually putting qualitative research on an equal
pedagogical footing with the quantitative research that nowadays is so dominant in educational
practice.
The Cases
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The next chapters present the particular case studies, culminating in the summary chapter
which presents the conclusions and recommendations of this report.
Post-Research Addendum
Case study methodology was not as applicable to this investigation as I had originally
anticipated it would be. In addition, although my initial interview subjects provided helpful
insights into practical matters – especially with regard to rubrics as they are used in practice –
my pursuit of further interview subjects willing to address political and administrative issues that
qualitative assessment programs face was not fruitful. This was for a variety of reasons, all of
which are relevant to the conclusions and recommendations that emerged from my research. In
addition, as part of my graduate studies, I unexpectedly obtained a compensated position as a
research assistant in the Ole Miss Center for Writing and Rhetoric, and this provided me with
some first-hand experience in the application of rubrics to program assessment, further driving
the direction of my research and the evolution of my research questions, and this turned out to be
more informative to my investigation than I had foreseen.
Case studies in qualitative assessment ended up being difficult to pursue because of the
dearth of long-term, successful programs available to serve as subject cases (Miller, 2012). This
problem is the result of a combination of factors I address in Chapters 4 and 5, but briefly: 1)
historically, qualitative assessment programs are dynamic and often change – necessarily or
otherwise – in response to both internal and external factors, and this process of change is
inevitably highly institution-specific and not particularly transferable due to its anecdotal nature,
and 2) the politics surrounding qualitative assessment programs are generally difficult to
navigate, and consequently can frequently be damaging to careers, reputations, and perhaps most
importantly, institutional culture.
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Even though I had sought and received IRB approval2 for my basic interview protocols
based on the principle that research into the effectiveness of educational programs does not
typically pose risks for participants, I did not anticipate that there would be as much potential
danger of personal harm to individuals speaking non-anonymously and on the record about what
emerged as such a contentious and challenging issue. One successful interviewee in particular
was able to provide some highly-relevant and timely insights into the current state of at least one
large-scale assessment program currently underway in American higher education, but due to the
commercially-proprietary nature of the technology involved, the interviewee and I agreed that I
am obligated to keep all of that data off the record and out of print. This restriction, however, did
not interfere with my subsequently seeking publically-available literature that further explores
the issues that interviewee raised, and then introducing those findings into my research from the
document source instead.
Furthermore, the two problematic factors above can make individuals cautious about
speaking directly to their experiences with qualitative assessment programs, and on several
occasions, would-be interviewees politely deferred during the initial contact and instead directed
me to published essays and reports (and in some cases, books) that reflected or at least were
consistent with their own experiences as educators and administrators and either directly or
indirectly addressed the avenues of my research while allowing my would-be subject(s) to avoid
becoming closely involved with my research. Most of these documents were peer-reviewed, but
there were also valuable personal insights (not always centrally-relevant, but useful in providing
context and background) to be gleaned from the more editorially-slanted monographs.
Consequently, I ended up doing significantly more reading of personal screeds than interviewing

2

Ole Miss IRB approval number 11-120.
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of subjects, but I am convinced that the quality of the resulting data is, if anything, higher as a
result.
Likewise, when I encountered corroborating experiences in my own professional
experience with qualitative assessment at the Ole Miss CWR, the direction of my research was
frequently further informed and revised, and I was able to identify new avenues of exploration in
my document-based research as well as receive basic confirmation of some of my fundamental
findings. All these considerations shaped the final study, as detailed in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 4: STUDIES IN ASSESSMENT PRAXIS
AND ESSENTIAL QUALIFYING TECHNOLOGY
“Conceptual simplicity, [with] structural complexity, achieves a greater state of
Humanity” (Shirow, 2004).
Overview
To study assessment without wasted effort, it is important to first establish a conceptual
framework to address what assessment is and how and why assessment is meaningful. Once such
cognitive and contextual parameters have been set out, considerations of how the practical tasks
of assessment are pursued – here, addressing qualitative assessment specifically – may then be
undertaken more fruitfully. Accordingly, this chapter looks first at the theoretical structure of
assessment per se, and then studies in depth the rubric as a highly-adaptable tool with an
effectively-unbounded range of applications appropriate to qualitative assessment purposes and
situations. From this analysis of the rubric, a general phenomenological ontology – a conscious
understanding of reality derived from the application of reason to experience – of the assessment
process may be conceptualized, both internally and externally to any given application.
The Parameters of Assessment
“No truth explains itself” (Holt, 2012, p. 132).
A fundamental methodological principle of epistemology – dating from Socrates and
earlier – is that a necessary precondition for any rational inquiry is that the subject of the inquiry
have, or at least be temporarily assigned, an identifying cognitive content at the outset of the
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investigation – i.e., one must have at least have a discrete, working definition of what one is
investigating before one begins the investigation, in order to meaningfully delimit the
investigatory process. This definition can potentially change and evolve as part of a feedback
loop that may or may not develop during the investigation, but with the (to date) singular
exception of problematic Hegelian-style dialectical, completely-emergent phenomenology
(which likely lies well outside the scope of something pragmatic such as the present study), the
questions of essence and existence cannot be considered in any useful depth without determining
at least some axiomatic notions of one or the other to serve as a starting point for the inquiry.
This is a known, and perhaps unavoidable, limitation of the faculty of human reason – whether
that reasoning is inductive or deductive (or even abductive, in the logical-inference sense of the
term) – and therefore, in accordance with established practices in critical thinking, I must begin
by seeking a clear conceptualization of what assessment is before I can reasonably proceed
further to considerations of how a particular method of assessment may be performed well.
In addition, my investigations have led me to conclude that many, if not most, of those in
academia who have engaged successfully with the issues of learning/outcome/program
assessment have identified some of the key pieces involved (and this often coming only after
hard-fought struggles), yet no one I have encountered seems to have successfully contextualized
the whole endeavor of qualitative assessment into a coherent, integrated conceptualization.
One reason for this lies in the principle that systems theory describes as incompleteness,
and the problems of undefinability that result therefrom. The incompleteness theorems first
published by Kurt Gödel in 1931 that show the limitations of syntax within first-order arithmetic
– in part by demonstrating undefinability – have been generalized to formal sematic systems by
later thinkers such as John von Neumann and Alfred Tarski. In brief, in any formal system of
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symbolic representation of cognitive content (i.e., a language of some sort or other), there are
propositions which are not provable within that system, and this is in part because the meaning
of the symbols used is always context-dependent upon the system containing them. Whereas this
has been proven in purely-mathematical systems, is has also been demonstrated that as a
corollary of said proof, the semantical concept of truth cannot be encoded entirely within any
given language or formal system, but instead requires a metalanguage capable of applying its
own transcendent predicates and positions to the objects of the first-order language (Tarski,
1983).
As a consequence of this second-order principle, purely top-down or bottom-up
epistemologies are each inherently limited. In the case of top-down models, essence precedes
existence – in other words, the model has a built-in prejudice in terms of what may be known –
whereas in bottom-up models, existence precedes essence – in other words, the epistemology can
only address what is already present in the phenomena. What is called for then, is a blended,
holistic approach to phenomenological ontology that combines the strengths of each traditional
epistemological strategy to compensate for the other’s weakness, allowing a phenomenological
ontology to emerge.
To date, one of the most enduring, landmark examinations of the parameters of
assessment is found in the work of Patrick T. Terenzini (1989). In addition to examining the
basic logistical issues faced by postsecondary institutions seeking to improve assessment
practices, Terenzini helpfully lays out an analytical framework for studying student outcomes,
and a brief summary of his taxonomy is worth including here.
As assessing educators, we must begin by addressing three general questions, plus a set
of particulars within each of those questions. First is the question of purpose: why the assessment
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is being undertaken (Terenzini, 1989). Although this may seem a pedantic issue, it is genuinely
informative as responses will generally fall into one of only two categories: assessments of
teaching and learning, which may be construed as formative matters, and assessments of
accountability, which may be construed as summative matters. Although it may be argued that
subsequent advancement of assessment models in the intervening years since the original
publication of Terenzini’s work has in some sense collapsed this distinction to the point that
summative assessments such as program assessments may now be considered simply a direct
extension of learning assessments (the other metric for program assessment being cost efficiency
and/or cost-benefit analysis) the formative/summative distinction remains useful for purposes of
understanding and justifying assessment efforts in terms of their ultimate purpose and utility;
formative assessments drive program modification and improvement, whereas summative
assessments inform judgments of program worth or value.
Second is the question of level: who is to be assessed (Terenzini, 1989). Here, the
distinction is drawn between individual students and aggregate groups of students. Traditionally,
assessing individual student outcomes is handled by instructors assigning grades, but programs
are more likely to be interested in aggregate student performance against some standard for
summative purposes. Terenzini notes that there are numerous grouping criteria that may be
relevant to program interests, be they either organizational (course, program, department,
college/school, campus, system) or demographic (gender, ethnicity, class year, major, residence,
etc.).
Third is the question of object: what is to be assessed (Terenzini, 1989). This is the most
complex and challenging question of the three, and Terenzini points to a broad four-fold
typology provided by Ewell (1984) as being both simple and comprehensive: 1) knowledge (both
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breadth and depth), 2) skills (including basic, higher-order, and career-related), 3) attitudes and
values, and 4) behavior (both during and after college) (Terenzini, 1989).
Together, these three dimensions from Terenzini and eight (sub-)criteria from Ewell can
encompass the entire scope of postsecondary assessment as it has been and might foreseeably be
practiced (Terenzini, 1989). Of greater interest to the present inquiry, however, are the various
problems that even well-designed assessment programs may run afoul of. In examining the
literature of case studies and analyses of assessment, I have developed a general taxonomy of the
problems assessment programs face, and an overview is presented here to serve as a basis for my
further analysis and exegesis.
In summary, and as to be detailed subsequently, assessment problems may be categorized
into four basic types. The first and foremost of these are conceptual problems best addressed by
Terenzini’s analytical framework: all stakeholders need to share a clear, common, and distinctlyarticulated set of ideas and expectations regarding any program of assessment that is undertaken,
and although different stakeholders may have particular vested interests – to which varying
degrees of significance and importance may be appropriately assigned – and whereas the
development of some of the specifics of this conceptualization must be an ongoing and
concurrent developmental part of the assessment process, having the conceptualization of the
assessment firmly grounded from the outset is essential to the assessment’s overall meaningful
success.
The second area of problems concerns measurement. This is a dual issue; at the core,
observer effects – originally from quantum physics, but nowadays extended to the social sciences
especially – can be difficult to counter inasmuch as modern scientific methodologies
acknowledge that even when taking into account other internal and external influences, anything
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that is measured may be observed to change over time in response to being measured (López,
2002). More problematically however, measurements of student learning may be either direct or
indirect. Whereas conventional instructor-administered subject-based examinations and tests
remain an essential part of teaching pedagogy, for broader assessment purposes direct measures
of learning are typically performance task-based and are characterized as being “authentic” in
the sense that they require students to solve realistic problems that are unstructured and have no
explicit “right” answers (López, 2002, p. 362). These direct measures are generally applied at the
individual level, at least in their initial data collection. Conversely, indirect measures focus on
the “perceived” extent or value of learning experiences and typically include instruments such as
surveys, cohort studies, exit interviews, and trend analyses, and their application is concentrated
more at the group level. Although the direct measurement scheme is obviously the more
immediately pragmatic of the two, both direct and indirect assessment measures that go beyond
the conventional written-answers-to-explicit-questions “test” (as such) are crucial to bringing
meaning to the assessment process by showing educators not only that students have learned, but
more essentially what it is that students have learned. Making this distinction is imperative when
discussing the purpose and goals of student testing at all levels of education.
The third problem area for learning assessment programs is the organizational, and
perhaps unsurprisingly this consideration also applies at more than one level: as with any
initiative successfully implemented within a organizational environment, an assessment program
must be internally organized and aligned with its goals and purpose, while simultaneously being
externally organized to function as an organic part of the institution it serves (Rossman & ElKhawas, 1987). Each of these two organizational aspects is equally crucial to the success of the
program.
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The fourth and final problem area I have identified is, perhaps as might be expected, the
political. The institutional culture typical of higher education embraces a unique combination of
anything-but-unique administrative and social relationships which can make or break any project
and the people involved with it, often irrespective of the relative merits of either (Shatzky, 2012).
This is perhaps the most complex and subtle of the four problem areas, but there are a myriad of
recognized ways to engage it, if the will can be found.
Instituting “Best Practices”
The notion of best practices might be uncharitably characterized as being
“…indistinguishable from mindless mimicry, the very opposite of academic discovery and
insight” (Cooper, 2012, para. 8). Though such a dismissive judgment is perhaps overly harsh, it
also may be indicative of the gulf that has developed in recent years between what has now
become the default perspective of administrators and that which has traditionally been held by
faculty in regard to what is valuable in higher education. Both factions may rightfully be viewed
as being results-oriented, and yet they may find themselves at odds over what results are to be
desired and prioritized within the institution. In the literature and in interviews, I have found that
best practices are often recommended solely on the basis of their ability to reliably produce the
desired outcomes, but these recommendations are often free of contextual or theoretical
groundings that do not rely upon some form of circular reasoning backwards from those
outcomes to begin with. The data is taken, and outcomes are defined and delimited by what may
be gleaned from that data, but rather than forming a dynamic, evolving feedback system, the data
may begin to drive the parameters of assessment by themselves. Ethical and pragmatic
considerations demand that this reflexive mechanism be improved upon in order for the
assessment to be authentic and meaningful instead of merely self-serving.
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Ultimately, any recommended best practices will naturally share certain essential
properties derived from practical experience that identify those practices as being effectively
“best” (and oftentimes this may simply be the result of trial-and-error testing in an environment
of institutional Darwinism), the foremost among these being repeatability and transferability
(hence the “mimicry” pejorative above). The principles of validity and reliability, as applied to
the analysis of assessments and their instrumentation, can support this kind of portable utility and
thereby establish foundational qualities for effective and valuable assessments to have in
common, even if the assessment programs themselves remain highly institution-specific
(Terenzini, 1989). I shall first address the foundational issues of how to establish qualitative
assessment best practices in the context of “bottom-up” technologies, and then address the
contextual and environmental challenges that assessment programs face using “top-down”
methodologies; in this way, each of the two aspects can compensate for the limitations of the
other, and as a result a coherent, integrated, and grounded theory can be realized.
Ewell (1984) points out that the “appropriate” outcomes of higher education were once
“relatively few and well agreed upon” (p. 18)3 inasmuch as they consisted of a straightforward
3
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combination of character building through a traditional liberal education with intellect building
through scholarship in a chosen academic discipline. In recent decades, however, this
conceptualization has changed and evolved in complexity to the point that new dimensions of
educational outcomes must now be invoked. Such dimensions may be understood as threefold
(and Ewell’s order is telling, p. 21): institutional objectives, student educational goals, and the
needs of society and other third-party stakeholders. It should not be overlooked that Ewell’s
notion of appropriateness is closely tied to a principle of accountability that was relatively
innocuous and virtuous in the early 1980s, but which has taken on a different political character
since the turn of the millennium – a character that is now focused on exerting external control.
Ewell (1984) does not fall into what I would characterize as the “trap” of accountability
however, recognizing that there is a crucial distinction between the empirical changes produced
in the student and the values placed upon those changes both inside and outside of the academy.
As educators, the effective delivery of learning to our students is and should be always our
overriding concern. As discussed in previous chapters, within the modern political climate
outside academe the primacy of this goal is increasingly subject to alteration and repurposing in
order to serve special interests at the expense of the public interest. As further analyzed below,
the inferences that may be drawn about student learning shape and are shaped by the interests
that are being served in actual practice. Although there will and should always be pressure for
external conformity in postsecondary outcomes, practical purposes drive the need for explicit,
institution-specific goals to be identified and acted toward instead of surrendering that function
to calls for and from external conformity.
This distinction then invites the question of what, precisely, a “learning outcome” is or
can be (Ewell, 1984, p. 16). The subtleties involved are non-trivial: on the one hand, the change
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characterized as “learning” can be construed as a relative increase in a student’s knowledge or
abilities from their initial state, but on the other hand, the change that carries the label “learning”
can be measured against an absolute scale of proficiency independent of the student’s initial
aptitude level. Each of these metrics may be informative in its own right, but their respective
utility depends on the specific analytical and assessment purpose to which each may be applied.
In addition to the issue of establishing the baseline reference against which the learning
(or progress) will be construed and measured, assessments (learning or otherwise) may be either
norm-referenced or criterion-referenced. The former refers to comparisons of performance
against that of peers (either internal or external to the context), whereas the latter refers to
performance as measured against objective standards (which may also be either internal or
external to the context). Although elements of both may be relevant to an assessment
undertaking, referencing criteria rather than norms is more foundational to the process of
phenomenological ontology that in turn grounds the assessment conceptually within the
discipline and the institution. Addressing primarily issues of standardized (and hence, morequantified) testing, Harris (1986) tells us:
You can compare your students to other students nationally on standardized tests without
having definite educational goals, stated expectancies, or outcomes. But without such
goals, you can’t be sure the tests reflect your curriculum. You and your colleagues may
also be interested in how your students change in terms of beliefs, interests, attitudes,
values, and behaviors. There are various commercially available inventories to reflect
these things. Yet again, without relatively clear student development goals, you won’t
know how to select the inventories that fit your institution. (p. 22)4
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This necessary contextualization of conventional test-based assessments extends even more
crucially to qualitative assessments, especially those developed from within the institution itself.
Although Ewell (1984) asserts that a lack of administration-driven incentives for the
faculty is the major obstacle to effective assessment reform, he provides several short case
studies of successful programs (and the other effects on their respective institutions) in the
second chapter of his report. As his report was subsequently used as a basis for recommendations
made by the United States Department of Education to American colleges and universities, the
significance and influence of his findings has been considerable.
Most notably, there are three key takeaways whose relevance has not diminished in the
intervening decades. First and foremost, Ewell (1984) finds that assessment programs do not
necessarily require high costs, specifically a “massive infusion of external resources;” instead,
Ewell contends that much of the cost of reforming the assessment process may be borne by
realigning existing internal assessment activities (p. 17). I have a few reservations about this
assertion, however. Critical thinking invites us to always consider the agenda behind and the
intended audience for an argument, and the reader cannot completely divorce Ewell’s conclusion
from the potentially propagandistic purposes that commissioned his research initially and to
which it may have been put. If an implicit goal of Ewell’s report is to introduce a call for
assessment reform and encourage its embrace, addressing the easiest and obvious objection
(“But it’s too expensive!”) directly makes good rhetorical sense. This in itself, unfortunately, is
insufficient to fully substantiate the truth of the claim that reformed, proper assessment is not
particularly expensive and merely requires some re-allocation of existing resources. Indeed, the
contemporary trade press and innumerable educator weblogs frequently devote a large potion of
their attention to the significant resource costs qualitative assessment programs incur nowadays
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(see López, 2002, in particular). Writing in 1984, perhaps Ewell is being overly-optimistic and
not disingenuous in anticipating that the costs of assessment could be expected to remain
constant and modest even in light of unforeseeable changes in technology and (external)
stakeholder expectations that drive corresponding change in the whats, whys, and wherefores of
learning outcomes.
Secondly amongst Ewell’s takeaways is his point that “effective” efforts must be both
“institution-specific and participatory in character” (p. 17). This point is well-supported by other
research and even other management contexts (as detailed below), but again, the critical thinker
might well take note of the following quote:
Neither government nor the research community can hope to impose solutions – no
matter how well informed – if faculty and administrators have not first internalized the
logic of these solutions through their own evaluations and experiences. (pp. 17-18)
Although it appears upfront enough, this statement is highly problematical as it reinforces what
has now been shown to be a contentious assumption that “top-down” implementation is
desirable, or even feasible, as the ultimate driving factor in assessment programs. To a close
reading of the subsequent chapters, it emerges that Ewell clearly acknowledges the necessary
“bottom-up” nature of the process, but still his choice of the verb “impose” remains. Thus,
Gallagher (2011) identifies something from policy literature bluntly labeled “the implementation
problem.” This “problem” results from the practical fact that “Policy directives… do not execute
themselves” but instead must be implemented by those farther down – often much farther down
– in the operational/managerial hierarchy from those who issue the directives and implement
them by “remote control” (Gallagher, p. 463). Darling-Hammond (1997) notes that such topdown management tactics are especially prone to failure in an environment of academic freedom
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due to processes of interpretation, redefinition, and even outright subversion influencing the
implementation. In turn, Gallagher explains, neoliberal education reformers at the top of
administrative hierarchies respond to the “problem” by attempting to tighten administrative
control with forced programs of scripted instruction, packaged curricula, and standardized testing
(p. 463). From Gallagher’s perspective, all these control mechanisms become in practice
obstacles to the processes of education and assessment, processes which are in the final analysis
based fundamentally upon teacher-student relationships and not upon instructional technologies.
In addition, Ewell (1984) tells us
Many educators argue that the very nature of the higher-education enterprise effectively
precludes improvement through increased external accountability. (p. 11)
Although these two factors from Ewell and Gallagher may be convincing to some, the “facts on
the ground” (to borrow a popular contemporary idiom) in a higher education system that is
increasingly beholden to neoliberal ideologies are best characterized by Ewell (1984) himself:
What we are now increasingly being asked to demonstrate is nothing more than that for
which we in the past have had the hubris to claim credit. (p. 12)
And this perfectly encapsulates the crux of the matter.
Ewell (1984) goes on to describe external standards applied to the academy as being
“alien” and “counterproductive” as they are antithetical to the very ideas of academic freedom
and inquiry – traditionally, academic standards have been maintained by the individual
disciplines organized within academia (p. 13). I note that the etymology of the word “discipline”
is no coincidence here.
Additionally, Ewell (1984) invites us to consider the traditional role of scholarship in not
merely building “society’s store of knowledge” (p. 13), but in driving civilization forward to new
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levels of self-regarding and self-improving, while simultaneously producing a similar manifest
excellence in the individual learners whose efforts build and advance civilization as a whole. As
thus envisioned, education is indeed a bottom-up process of individual- and civilization-building.
Tools for the Job
The rubric is arguably the instrument of choice to use when pursuing qualitative
assessment in any form; Stevens and Levi (2005) describe the rubric with disarming simplicity as
“a scoring tool that lays out the specific expectations for an assignment” (p. 3). The advantage of
rubrics comes from combining the utility of being applicable to an unbounded range of
assessment scenarios with the virtue of establishing objective criteria for assessing – criteria that
are themselves subject to review and evaluation. Rubrics are initially devised using a top-down
internal methodology in order to delimit and define the outcomes under consideration, but are
subsequently effectively applied – and revised as may be necessary – in a bottom-up feedback
process directly driven by those who are employing the tool. As Stevens and Levi provide a
definitive overview of the process of constructing a rubric, I shall include a brief, annotated
summary of their guidelines as framework here.
The process of constructing a new rubric to use in an assessment (or editing/repurposing
an existing rubric) first begins with a task description (Stevens & Levi, 2005). From the outset
then, the instrument aligns itself with performance-task-based assessment rather than fact-recallbased assessment. This focus is appropriate to qualitative assessments that explore not merely
whether or not students have mastered a body of knowledge, but to what use students can put
that knowledge mastery. Typically, this part of rubric design is addressed by assigning an
appropriate title to the rubric and, space permitting, including an explicit statement describing
the task to be assessed. It is important not to omit or gloss this element, as it may be very
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informative to both the students and external stakeholders who seek documentation of the
assessment process in order to understand the context within which the rubric is, was, or will be
applied.
The second part of rubric-building consists in devising a scale that reflects various levels
of qualitative achievement and that may be used for quantitative analysis (Stevens & Levi,
2005). As this scale is by default an objective one, the associated learning outcomes may be
considered standardized. This point is highly significant, as it is essential to rebutting criticisms
from the more purely-quantitative assessment camps that qualitative assessment lacks sufficient
standardization. The real issue present is that, in the institutional context, this rubric-driven
standardizing is driven from the bottom up instead of the top down, and yet in practical terms
this does not make any developed standard any less of a standard, merely less of a mechanism
for wielding authoritarian control within or over the institution.
Stevens and Levi (2005) make the point that the achievement scale need not be overlygranular; a five-point scale is usually preferable to a ten-point one in terms of the ease and speed
with which it may be applied, and my experience suggest that a four-point scale may be better
still due to the fact that it forces every rater to actively evaluate each criterion and subsequently
score it either above or below the mathematical, midpoint average. Typically, the scoring should
be normalized (by design and in practice) in such a way as to generate an average value for each
criterion in the middle of the four-point range, but that average only emerges from the data
analysis – raters are not allowed to lazily assign it. In this way, the “average” level of
performance is more honest, as it is necessarily an artifact that emerges as a consequence of an
evaluation yet is not and cannot be an explicit choice by a rater.
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Generally, even a three-point rating scale is usable (extending even to Fail/Pass/Honors
conventions, for example), but a two-point scale is not (Stevens & Levi, 2005), as scales this
short can lack the ability to make meaningful distinctions in performance. If all-or-nothing
measures are desired, it is possible to devise component checklists within each criterion of the
rubric and then sum them to yield a general level of performance for that criterion, selecting
different levels of student competence on each sub-criterion if particular aspects of student
performance within the overall criterion vary.
Although Stevens and Levi do not explore it in detail, it should be noted that for
alternative purposes performance levels that are defined relative to the baseline (pre-treatment,
i.e., pre-learning) proficiency of the individual student(s) are often possible to devise and apply
to different outcome considerations. Indeed, one of the advantages of performance-based
assessment is that with sufficient data capture (retaining written work, retaining recordings of
presentations, etc.) it is possible to re-assess historical task performances using completely
different rubrics in service of completely different outcome assessment – a possibility largely
precluded in conventional, multiple-choice-based standardized testing. For example, at the Ole
Miss Center for Writing and Rhetoric we have from time to time in recent years re-assessed our
collected archive of student writings in terms of different program outcomes, devising new
rubrics as necessary to let us identify emergently-relevant historical trends in different qualia
that may be found in our growing repository of student writing samples. The subsequent findings
of these re-assessments have then informed decisions about pedagogical revision within our
writing program.
The third part of rubric-building consists of determining the “dimensions” of the
assessment (Stevens & Levi, 2005). These factors should be identified and labeled with nouns,
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not qualifiers, and are chosen by the educator(s) to capture the essential qualities of the
performance task as may be formulated in the (learning) outcomes.
It is here that a rubric gains (or not) the basis of its validity. The meaningful
correspondence – or lack thereof – between the what is assessed and what is learned hinges upon
the appropriateness and fitness of the dimensions of the assessment to the sought outcomes of the
educational process. I have done some preliminary research into applying factor analysis to this
part of rubric design to investigate whether or not a rubric’s dimensions may be reliably
constructed to be functionally orthogonal to each other, and the initial results are promising. Yet
I only mention this in passing here for completeness, as even the most mutually-orthogonal of
assessment criteria/factors may be still be invalid if the design of the rubric is not properly
grounded in a sound phenomenological ontology, and so I shall further examine the issue of
validity in a moment. Here, I simply note the direct correspondence between the
phenomenological ontology that the learning pedagogy is intended to foster in the learner(s) and
the optimal structure of the rubric that is devised to assess that learning. This is the crucial aspect
of rubric design and use.
The fourth and final part of rubric-building consists of providing the descriptions of the
various levels of performance within each dimension (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Stevens and Levi
recommend that the highest level of performance should be explicitly described, with lower
levels being subsequently codified in relation to this benchmark as desired, and students (as well
as raters) typically report having this expectation set out for them plainly is informative and
useful (L. Schrock, personal communication, Spring 2012; S. Flaschka, personal communication,
Spring 2012). Rubrics which concentrate only upon specifying the highest level of performance,
and rating students in terms of how their performances measure up to this single standard are
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typically classified as scoring guide rubrics. However, rubrics that describe all the levels of
performance – from the highest to the lowest – are more common, and this is because although
scoring guide rubrics are simpler to write (Stevens & Levi, 2005), rubrics with more detailed
descriptions are easier and faster to use (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012).
Time-efficiency is a key factor in all aspects of rubric use. Stevens and Levi (2005)
mention that the time invested in devising and writing the rubric is quickly recouped in using it.
This is because a well-designed rubric can function as a form of checklist, enabling the user to
avoid the need to write the same notes over and over from paper to paper (for example). The
more detailed the rubric, the faster it is to work through in applied use.
Beyond the emphasis on time-efficiency, Stevens and Levi (2005) also broadly address
the general question of why rubric use is desirable and valuable, identifying essentially six
different elements of a comprehensive rationale. Pursuant to their book’s goal of promoting
rubric use, they frame their justifications in wholly practical terms without touching much upon
the theoretical and conceptual considerations that might also be involved. Such considerations,
however, are highly relevant and it is a simple-enough matter to identify and understand them.
Extending the time-efficiency paradigm, Stevens and Levi note that the ability of the
grader to rapidly process the assessment consequently facilitates providing timely feedback to the
student, and this timeliness is viewed as being essential to the learning process (2005, p. 18).
Furthermore, as students tend to make the same or similar mistakes on any one assignment,
predictable notes may be incorporated into the rubric’s dimensions to specifically address these
mistakes or shortcomings in the desired outcomes. Stevens and Levi do not explore it in much
detail, but this design consideration specifically aligns the instrument – the rubric – with the
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assessment of explicit learning outcomes, and the relevance of a rubric’s dimensions to its
validity arise from this congruence.
In addition to timely feedback, the rubric can also provide detailed feedback on
performance, as the specifics within the evaluated dimensions can give students categorical
explanations for why an assessment was scored the way it was (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Students
often report that they struggle in their comprehension not only with course content, but also with
instructor expectations, and the more details a rubric includes, the more clearly instructor
expectations may be understood (A. Myatt, personal communication, Summer 2012).
Stevens and Levi (2005) suggest that an instructor retain copies – either physical or
electronic – of student-submitted originals for the purpose of tracking student performance over
time (even using perhaps a different rubric), but personal experience shows that such document
retention and preservation practices can also be essential in preventing student challenges to
assigned grades based on altered, counterfeit versions of the work offered to one’s superiors as
“evidence” of grader error. Caveat lector.
As an extension of the feedback process, rubrics encourage critical thinking by helping
students self-analyze (Stevens & Levi, 2005). It is a basic truism in education that selfassessment is a prerequisite for self-improvement, and such self-improvement is often an implicit
– if not explicit – learning outcome in its own right.
Equally important, however, is the fact that rubrics facilitate communication with others
in the instructional process. Stevens and Levi (2005) note that this is particularly valuable in
regards to the work of both teaching/graduate assistants who have been assigned to instructors as
graders and to the efforts of any tutors who might be involved in the pedagogy. Clear and
meticulous communication of outcome expectations to third parties functioning in intermediating
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roles between instructors and students is essential to providing an effective education to those
students. The crucial nature of this communication may also be extended to new faculty and
adjuncts who may lack their more-senior colleagues’ long-term familiarity with a given
curriculum, as well as among those senior colleagues themselves when there is a pre-established
departmental goal of delivering a common curriculum. In practice, this consideration applies
primarily to lower-division undergraduate courses more than upper-division or graduate-level
ones, and as such, it is even desirable on occasion to have a unified rubric employed departmentwide pursuant to curricular consistency in 100-level instruction. In the Ole Miss Center for
Writing and Rhetoric, for example, as much of our freshman composition instruction is handled
by adjuncts and inexperienced graduate students, a set of core-faculty-devised common grading
rubrics is an essential part of our instructional quality control and outcome reliability (or
consistency).
In a similar vein, a good rubric can help refine our teaching skills (Stevens & Levi,
2005). Institutional and program assessments can analyze scored rubrics to gain insight into the
effectiveness of teaching and pedagogy. Whereas some instructors may be put on the defensive
at the suggestion that they be judged (partially) on the basis of their students’ learning, it should
be noted that a post hoc examination of scored rubrics can provide more reliable insight into
student learning than the traditional, problematical student evaluations of instruction do, having
removed the opportunity for students to introduce bias in their responses to instruction (such as
might be present, intentionally or not, in replies to survey questions). This is admittedly a more
indirect method of assessing instructor effectiveness, yet it also more objective and is therefore
more desirable: rubrics provide tangible evidence of student learning (when it occurs). The
implications of this for evaluative purposes are clear.
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Lastly, rubrics level the playing field academically (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Rubrics may
be used in any and all disciplines, and provide a mechanism where diverse outcomes in a wide
variety of tasks, each variously relative to institutional goals, may be evaluated in a similar
manner. Beyond specific course/degree requirements, rubrics can yield insight into cognitive
conceptualizations and phenomenology that signify mastery of a subject and are transferable to
other disciplines and academic/non-academic applications. This is because rubrics can address
cognitive contexts, backgrounds, and biases in ways useful to an administrative understanding of
the learner and the learning process. Furthermore, consistent, broadly-applied rubric use can
yield a proverbial “paper trail” of a student’s learning, and this has relevance at every scale
ranging from the individual learner’s growth and development as a student up to the institutionwide accreditation process and beyond, documenting the tangible education as it occurs.
Within the labor of constructing (or perhaps even merely re-evaluating) a rubric, the
process may be divided into roughly four stages (Stevens and Levi, 2005). I use the word
“roughly” because experience shows that it is not necessary to be completely pedantic about the
task of rubric construction, nor are the stages in practice necessarily as distinct and clear-cut as
Stevens and Levi would have them in theory. Nonetheless, the general four-stage method
consists of reflecting, listing, grouping and labeling, and finally application. Taken in total, this
progression forms an integrated phenomenological ontology – one that should reflect in
microcosm the larger curricular content.
The foundational exposition of this phenomenological ontology may be found in the
questions Stevens and Levi provide to prompt the initial reflection stage. Although the
components considered at the outset do not bear any necessary correspondence to the final
dimensions the rubric embodies, they can guide and delimit the assessment context as thoroughly
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as may be desired (Stevens & Levi, 2005). By analyzing this initial ontology, we may gain
insight into the broader value and meaning of the task, the assessment instrument, and the
outcome(s) as an educational technology. The questions Stevens and Levi pose to us in the
beginning stage of rubric design are as follows:
•

Why this assignment?

•

What is the history of this assignment?

•

What is the place of this assignment within the curriculum?

•

What are the skills required for this assignment?

•

What is the specific task of the assignment? (And does it have component tasks?)

•

What is evidence of accomplishing the task?

•

What are your highest expectations of performance?

•

What are the failure modes? (Historically or expected?)

It is of course possible and perhaps even desirable to rephrase or otherwise contextualize these
basic eight inquiries for particular disciplines or programs, yet upon examination it becomes
clear that any conceivable educational or institutional outcome can be subsumed under one or
more of these focused questions. The correspondence of the structure of the Stevens and Levi
ontology to that put forth by Terenzini reflects an underlying commonality addressed by their
respective phenomenologies: by considering, from within a clearly-identified conceptual
framework, all the aspects of what the desired outcomes are and how those outcomes may be
understood, we as educators can assess any learning process in a reliably systematic manner, and
that system will have certain individually-specified, yet generally-universal properties that are
shared across inter-disciplinary and inter-institutional environments. This yields the validity of
the rubric-as-instrument, as discussed further below.
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The subsequent stages of the method all represent refinements and extensions of the basic
schema set out in the beginning, foundational stage of reflection. The answers to the reflective
prompts then inform the next stage: listing (Stevens & Levi, 2005). The purpose of the listing
process is to inferentially identify discrete themes and concepts, from a constructivist model of
learning, that an assessment may address. The listing stage is perhaps the most problematic in the
process, as it requires the instructor(s) to confront the sometimes-dreaded notion of learning
objectives. As a consequence, this is often the place in any assessment project where faculty
resistance is greatest (Banta & Blaich, 2011; Reed, Levin, & Malandra, 2001; Tagg, 2012), and
so I will examine it in more detail below. For now, I simply note that the opportunity to take
ownership of the delineation and exegesis of learning objectives represents academic freedom at
its most fundamental: the faculty may decide for themselves what shall be taught by clearly
specifying to the administration what shall be learned. Good leadership within the institution is
required to facilitate the embrace of this perhaps most tedious and pedantic of tasks, yet retaining
ultimate authority over learning objectives can form a strong bulwark for supporting a faculty’s
role in shared governance and maintaining the institution’s quality of scholarship.
The listing process is not without its own guidance. In practice, learning objectives flow
naturally from contemplation of the eight questions from the previous stage, as well as being
informed by curricular/catalog course descriptions and discipline-specific program goals
(Stevens & Levi, 2005). Once the learning objectives have been identified and described in a list,
they may then be codified in the subsequent stage of grouping and labeling.
Ideally the objectives should be assigned to thematically-similar groups, and the
dimension of each group should be as orthogonal as possible to those of all the others; in other
words, we want to group like with like and make certain that the resulting groups are distinct and
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discrete, with little overlap. This process is more art than science, but may be assisted with
formal tools such as the aforementioned factor analysis and, most importantly and as indicated
above, considerations of the instrument’s validity. The former element is more post hoc to the
assessment process and plays a larger role in the revision process a rubric should be periodically
subjected to – such revision being central to the latter, less-formal element. Validity is a complex
subject in assessment, and there is much that has been written addressing its overall challenges,
but for the moment my focus will stay on the technology of rubrics in and of themselves.
Besides grouping the outcomes into an ordered structure, the various levels of
accomplishment in performance should be labeled (Stevens & Levi, 2005). In the case of a
holistic scoring guide rubric, the individual performance criteria for each level should be
specified in order to compensate for the potential lack of detail such rubric offers the student in
comparison to a more-elaborate multi-level rubric (S. Smith, personal communication, Summer
2012). The combination of these two grouping and labeling mechanics then yields the traditional,
structured form that gives a rubric its categorical schema. In all cases, designers should bear in
mind that the number of groups multiplied by the number of labels yields the total number of
elements the rubric will span, and this number should be large (and therefore detailed) enough to
make the feedback meaningful but not so large (and therefore complex) as to make the feedback
difficult to comprehend.
The final stage of rubric-building (or revision) is the application of the chosen schema to
the design and layout of the rubric grid (Stevens & Levi, 2005). Arranging the factors in a grid
layout facilitates the ease-of-use and clarity of the rubric by generating a matrix that recapitulates
the ontology the rubric is intended to represent, and this correspondence in turn is central to
ascertaining the instrument’s validity, as below.
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Some further detail on the differences between scoring guide rubrics and multi-level
rubrics is appropriate here. Of the two, the scoring guide is the simpler design (Stevens & Levi,
2005, p. 39). On the plus side, a scoring guide gives greater flexibility in response, and is better
suited to real-time grading of performance tasks. On the minus side, a scoring guide does not
provide particularly detailed feedback unless more time is invested later (after the task is
completed). For more-comprehensive assessments, a multi-level rubric is preferable (with
Stevens and Levi recommending 3 to 5 levels for each criterion, p.79), as such rubrics can
combine detail with efficiency. Since devising a multi-level rubric requires specifying a greater
level of detail under each criterion, it can be slower to create than a comparable scoring guide,
yet the resulting tool is also faster in actual use, since scoring on a multi-level rubric can often be
reduced to simply marking the corresponding levels of performance on each criterion in the prewritten matrix. In contrast, scoring guide rubrics allow for greater individualization of the
feedback along with greater flexibility in the form that feedback may take. Typically, a scoring
guide rubric gives a student a set of “structured notes” as feedback, whereas the multi-level
rubric provides a detailed checklist (p.79). Either, or even some hybrid combination of both, may
be selected as appropriate to any given task, but I should note that multi-level rubrics more-easily
lend themselves to statistical analysis, as they are already arranged in a gridded matrix of criteria
and scores within those criteria. It is of course also possible to perform statistical analyses of
pure scoring guide rubrics, but some qualitative data coding of the scored rubrics may be
required first, requiring more additional time and labor to prepare for analysis than evaluativelycomparable multi-level rubrics do.
It is plausible that scoring guide rubrics are better suited to assessing graduate student and
creative work (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012; L. Schrock, personal
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communication, Spring 2012), but this is debatable (P. Hill, personal communication, Summer
2012; S. Smith, personal communication Summer 2012). In practice, as to the form a rubric
might most-usefully take, the deciding factor is typically the time-management of the assessor
(A. Myatt, personal communication, Summer 2012). The literature is surprisingly tacit on this
distinction and the relative advantages of either option, perhaps because it is a comparatively
minor one best accommodated as a particular assessment context may individually require. I
include this anecdotal finding from some of my interviewees here simply for completeness, and I
note that general experience suggests that the multi-level rubric is better suited for use in
situations where the instructor is not the grader – using the more-detailed format, it is
theoretically possible to instill some basic quality control in an assessment process that relies
heavily upon graduate assistants and/or teaching assistants to function as graders by providing a
rubric that is detailed and explicit in its outcomes (and expectations) to both those who produce
the work and those who grade the work. This then serves as a highly-germane instance of
facilitating communication, as mentioned above.
One area of salient interest that Stevens and Levi only barely address is that of
metarubrics (2005, p. 93). It is highly significant to program assessment that rubrics may be
devised to assess the effectiveness of rubric use in learning assessment. In fact, rubrics may be
devised to assess any and all administrative tasks, at any and all levels. Stevens and Levi gloss
this point somewhat, but they do mention in passing that metarubrics are most-often employed as
a personal tool to objectively evaluate one’s own rubrics and rubric use (also referenced in K.
Schmidt, personal communication, Autumn 2012). Perhaps because they are pursuing a
particular agenda in pitching rubrics as a program-level tool for individual students’ learning
assessment, Stevens and Levi may overlook the value of the metarubric in program (and maybe
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even instructor) assessment. This is a significant omission, however, inasmuch as rubrics at all
levels of application strike a useful balance between academic freedom and
curricular/pedagogical standards (A. Myatt, personal communication, Summer 2012, S.
Flaschka, personal communication, Autumn 2012), and this is arguably the most important
takeaway that rubrics have to offer.
As to the particular tasks to which rubrics may be effectively applied, perhaps the most
relevant to modern educational goals is the student portfolio, or its contemporary evolution, the
student electronic portfolio (Banta, 2006). As a historically-collected set of performance task
artifacts, the portfolio is emerging as the leading candidate to augment, or even replace, the
series of conventional examinations that have traditionally been used to assess student learning.
Interestingly, the value of a portfolio as an assessment technology lies – perhaps unsurprisingly –
in the emergent phenomenological ontology that the artifacts of the portfolio shape. Banta also
notes:
No standardized exam is truly content free, and if it were, it would be a better test of
general intelligence than of what is learned in college. The near-perfect correlation of
CLA [the Collegiate Learning Assessment] scores with ACT/SAT scores suggests that
the CLA may be a better measure of the abilities students bring with them to college than
of the learning they take away. (p. 3)
Subsequently moving to a fundamentally qualitative perspective, the task for raters of portfolios
then becomes one of evaluating the phenomenological ontology of the portfolio within the
context of the desired leaning outcomes, rather than against some objectively-established
content-based criteria. This perhaps daunting undertaking is therefore best attended to with a
well-designed rubric that follows the guidelines I have set out above (following Terenzini, then
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Stevens and Levi), approaching portfolio evaluation from the top down in terms of the need to
assess student learning, but also from the bottom up in applied consideration of how those
outcomes may best be captured in particular assessment criteria. I hasten to add however, that
this shift in emphasis to looking at form-plus-content rather than content-by-itself for the
purposes of qualitative assessment is not intended to suggest that quantitative, content-based, and
even standardized, tests should be considered somehow obsolete, but rather that the recognized
limitations of purely content-based assessments may be overcome using qualitative methods, and
therefore a program may embrace and demonstrate a wider spectrum of learning outcomes –
especially in the case of applied learning – than is reflected in the mere recall of disciplinerelevant facts. If the portfolio, as we may have been promised, is truly a “golden door” that opens
onto insights into the depth, breadth, and scope of a student’s learning, then the rubric devised
for assessing that portfolio may be thought of as the “golden key” that unlocks the door. This
comprehensive functionality derives from the construct validity that forms an essential part of
the assessment technology, as I will detail further below.
At this point, a concerned reader might raise the objection that the highly programspecific nature of a well-designed rubric effectively precludes such a rubric being of much use
outside the particular institutional department where it has been devised and applied. This is
indeed a meaningful concern, as the entire process of designing and refining a rubric to match
the specific learning outcomes of a specific context would appear to make the instrument too
individualized to have relevance elsewhere. However, this is precisely why I assert that rubric
design should be approached in accordance with the systematic, theoretical frameworks built
from the models of Terenzini and Stevens and Levi: by relying upon a common conceptual
framework as a starting point, and presuming that there is a more-or-less objective nature to the
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content of any given discipline, highly institution-specific rubrics may still share a common
phenomenology (from the rubric-building process) and a common ontology (from the established
conventions of the discipline); the differences between any two different rubrics used in different
institutions (but similar or corresponding disciplines) will be, upon deep inspection, merely
cosmetic, provided there is some inter-institutional correspondence between designated learning
outcomes.
Thus, although the rubrics as instruments in and of themselves may not have
transferability, the process whereby they are devised, applied, and revised will. In this processoriented rather than object-oriented way, assessment that relies upon rubrics can serve the
sometimes-incongruent goals of institutionally-individualized academic freedom and disciplinebased-standards of academic accreditation simultaneously. This benefit derives from the
methodology behind the process of consistent assessment practice facilitated by suitable rubric
use, and not from any particular, individual details of how the process is manifested from
institution to institution. In other words, how we assess is evaluated in terms of the interinstitutional, shared phenomenological ontology of the rubric-as-instrument, rather than a simple
comparison of particular student performance tasks and their associated customized rubrics from
one program to another. It should not be surprising that, given the emphasis on process (tasks
that demonstrate applied learning, for example) that is typical of qualitative assessments in
comparison to the purely objects-of-knowledge orientation (identification/recitation of facts, for
example) that characterizes typical quantitative assessments, qualitative assessment can offer
perspectives on student learning which are unique to qualitative technologies, but are
universally-applicable to institutional, educational missions. Ultimately then, it is the
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methodology of rubrics which is transferable, if the same cannot be said of any particular rubric
in and of itself.
The Question of Validity
This perspective on transferability, underpinned as it is by a theoretical notion, rests
heavily upon establishing the validity of rubrics and their associated phenomenological
ontologies for its own legitimacy and virtue. In his landmark essay on the subject, Messick
(1989) defines validity as:
…[an] integrated, evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and
theoretical rationale support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions
based on test scores. (p. 13)
I note that, especially for the present purposes, this definition should be construed as referring to
an on-going process, rather than a static, one-off effort, and this makes it consistent with the
continual re-evaluation process necessary for effective rubric use. Messick’s definition is focused
on quantitative measurements in the tradition Brown (1996) further defines as “the degree to
which a test measures what it claims, or purports, to be measuring” (p. 231). Given that the
history of assessment validity has developed a mature theoretical model that relies heavily upon
inferences about evidence of learning, and even in light of the contemporary aphorism that
“measurement is easy, meaning is hard,” I contend that it is a straightforward (although nontrivial) task to insert considerations of meaning into validity theory along lines similar to those
which have been well-established for measurement, and that the necessary groundwork for doing
so has already been laid out by validity theorists.
In addition, as my analysis relies heavily upon the fact that the notion of constructs is
central to modern validity theory, I propose some operational characteristics, extrapolated from
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the literature, to conceptually delimit the concept of a construct here. Borrowing from behavioral
psychology – and momentarily setting aside my focus on phenomenological ontologies – a
construct may be simply defined as a label used to describe behavior. This plainly non-rationalist
definition is purely operational, but given that as educators we must rely upon empirical,
objective technologies when performing assessments (and can expect to continue to do so unless
some form of telepathic technology is invented that allows us to directly access student thought
processes to look for evidence of learning), the non-metaphysical, non-mentalist model from
behavioral psychology is useful in practice. From this behaviorist perspective then, the label
“construct” refers to a not-directly-observed (or in the psychological vernacular, “latent”)
characteristic of the subject (here, the learner). Typical examples of this are things like creativity,
intelligence, reading comprehension, and beliefs.
The most important property of constructs that must be given due consideration is that, at
least in the empirical sense, constructs do not have material-ontological status and thus do not
technically exist in the objective, materialist sense of the word. This has given more empiricallyinclined researchers a great deal of difficulty (Slaney & Racine, 2013), but it should be noted that
empiricism has always had trouble handling names (since empiricists typically deny the preexistence of the thing the name refers to, which can be highly problematical when dealing with
real-but-non-material things such as numbers). This incidental point is not of much concern to
my analysis, however; it is sufficient to take the label as behavioral psychologists prefer to use it
at face value and, for the sake of analysis, allow it to have enough cognitive content to be taken
as referring to something that emerges in the learner (either mentally or behaviorally, as one’s
philosophy may see fit) that is constructed as a result of the learning process. It is this useful and
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informative thing, the “construct,” that is then somehow to be measured by the assessment
process.
In this way, it is not even strictly necessary to import the entire apparatus of a
phenomenological ontology into consideration of a instrument’s (here, a rubric’s) validity; the
process of evaluating validity may be performed from a purely-empirical (but perhaps not
purely-materialist) perspective, and this point is crucial to establishing the objective nature of
rubric-based assessments. Furthermore, the aforementioned reliance, detailed below, upon
inference in establishing instrumental validity belies the inherent mental nature of the entire
enterprise, empirical/materialist preferences, perspectives, and predispositions notwithstanding.
As originally considered by Messick (1980), test validity is theoretically conceived of as
being a combination of three factors: 1) content validity, 2) criterion validity, and 3) construct
validity. Content validity is concerned with the relevance and coverage of the domain under
examination; i.e., whether the instrument addresses the subject area specifically and
representatively. This is the most straightforward of the three, but is included due to its
foundational importance: measurements should not be so indirect as to lack meaningful
relevance. Criterion validity has two dimensions: predictive validity and concurrent validity.
Together, these two give the test its predictive and diagnostic utility (within the relevant
theoretical framework under examination), and by extension, the test’s reliability. However, by
far the most complex and detailed of the three is construct validity.
Messick (1980) initially breaks this one down into a plethora of components: convergent
validity, discriminant validity, trait validity, nomological validity, factorial validity, substantive
validity, structural validity, external validity, population validity, ecological validity, temporal
validity, and finally task validity. Ultimately however, drawing from his own research and that of
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Cronbach (1969) earlier, Messick (1989) eventually moves to a unified conception of validity
centered entirely around construct validity (Ruhe, 2002). This shift is made possible by further
examination of what a construct is, and by subsequently extending and simplifying the definition
of the term. Eventually, the unitary construe of construct validity emerges from the fact that there
are many potential sources of evidence bearing on the appropriateness of inference(s) related to
the construct of interest (Cizek, 1997).
In the modern vernacular of the American Psychological Association (APA) and the
American Educational Research Association (AERA), “validity” refers to “the appropriateness,
meaningfulness and usefulness of the specific inferences made from test scores” (APA,
AERA/NCME, 1985). Here, the traditionally-quantitative notion of “scores” is inclusively
defined by Messick (1989) “broadly to mean any coding or summary of observed patterns on a
test, questionnaire, work sample[,] or portfolio” (Ruhe, 2002, p. 149). This usage then explicitly
extends the concept of validity to purely qualitative assessments, while simultaneously providing
guidance into how to apply it.
Validation practice is the collection of evidence used to assess validity (Ruhe, 2002).
Traditional sources of this evidence include “measures of content representativeness, internal
consistency[,] and reliability and correlations with alternate measures” (Moss, 1992, p. 245),
whereas in recent years, these evidentiary sources have been expanded to encompass both
performance assessment and social consequences to further assess the functional worth of the
assessment and by extension, the treatment/learning (Messick, 1998; Ruhe, 2002).
Messick (1998) eventually resolves that:
All validity is of one kind, namely, construct validity. Other so-called separate types of
validity – whether labeled content validity, criterion-related validity, consequential
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validity, or whatever – cannot stand alone in validity arguments. Rather, these so-called
validity types refer to complementary forms of evidence to be integrated into an overall
judgment of construct validity. What needs to be valid are the inferences made about
score meaning, namely the score interpretation and its action implications for test use. (p.
37)
which, for my purposes, leads right back around to the importance of a good theoretical
grounding for rubric design and use, rather than a mere mimicking of previously-effective rubric
forms, to establish the parameters of meaning inside and outside the assessment context.
What eventually emerges from Messick’s theorizing is popularly characterized as
Messick’s Validity Framework. This framework consists of a unified conceptualization of
construct validity for test (I would prefer “technology” or “instrument,” in the case of a
task/rubric combination) interpretation and use, and has three component dimensions (Messick,
1995; Ruhe, 2002). The evidential basis for test interpretation is based upon the empirical
analysis of all data used in construct validation and inter-construct relations. The evidential basis
for test use also analyzes construct validation, but examines its relevance and utility to external,
applied contexts such as social or vocational environments. Finally, the consequential basis of
validity considers the value implications of score interpretation as a basis for action, and the
actual and potential consequences of test use, especially as may regard sources of invalidity
stemming from issues of bias, fairness, and distributive justice (Messick, 1980).
These last points require some further exegesis here. Modern educational theorists have
extended this framework of Messick’s to encompass at least two additional analytical
perspectives (Moss, Girard, & Haniford, 2006). In addition to relying upon educational
measurement in the traditional sense as set out by Terenzini, validity theory is nowadays also
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informed by hermeneutics and sociocultural studies. On the one hand, considerations of validity
as depending on an epistemological understanding of the relevant phenomenological ontology
grounds that approach in a basic philosophy of (here, social) science that addresses the nature
and justification of knowledge claims. On the other hand however, this basic assessment context
may be extended by “interpretive social science” (p. 110) to provide further relevant insights into
the nature and extent of learning.
Historically, validation practice has focused on the intended interpretations of test scores
in lieu of deconstructing the test itself (Moss et al., 2006). A more flexible approach to validation
practice should be one:
…that can develop, analyze, and integrate multiple types of evidence at different levels of
scale; that is dynamic so that questions, available evidence, and interpretations can evolve
dialectically as inquirers learn from their inquiry; and that allows attention to the
antecedents and anticipated and actual consequences of… [the learners] interpretations,
decisions, and actions. (p. 111)
As validity theory evolved into a unitary notion of construct validity (Messick, 1989), it became
increasingly important to understand the value implications of both score meanings and the use
to which those scores were put (Moss et al., 2006). This is addressed in the first criterion of
Messick’s Validity Framework as he offers considerations of sources of evidence for basic forms
of hypothesis testing in establishing the basis for test interpretation. These proffered sources are
many, but Shepard (1993) notes that there are legitimate objections to the characterization of
validation practice as pure scientific inquiry. For one, allowing considerations of score meaning
to precede considerations of the use to which the test is put undermines the objectivity of the
validation inasmuch at such a practice prejudices the contextualization process and biases the
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application of any theoretical frameworks that might be appealed to in establishing validity.
Furthermore, when this approach is combined with the ongoing process of validity reassessment, such could incubate “the sense that the task is insurmountable” within the assessors
which could in turn lead to shortcuts being taken in the rigor of the evidence-collecting practice
(p. 429).
Although these concerns are addressed by the grounded-theory approach to rubric design
and application that I am advocating, there is still room for extension and refinement. In light of
the issues raised by Shepard in response to Messick’s methodology, Kane (2006) calls for a lessabstract and more practical approach to validity theory built on two distinct, but complementary,
kinds of arguments. First, Kane identifies the interpretive argument as one that straightforwardly
sets out the various inferences and assumptions that lead from the observed task performance to
the significance and meanings assigned to that task performance. From there, the validity
argument uses logical reasoning and empirical evidence to evaluate the interpretive argument
and each of its assumptions. Kane’s idea is that by explicitly elucidating the interpretive
argument in a separate process, it protects considerations of validity from making implicit – and
therefore potentially-inappropriate – interpretive assumptions by making lacunae or omissions in
the evidence harder to ignore.
Kane (1992) helpfully lists and describes the various categories of inferences used in
building interpretive arguments:
•

Scoring (or observation) inferences involve assigning some scaled, or at least relative,
value to each performance or element of a performance

•

Generalization inferences extend the interpretation from the observed performance(s) to
similar tasks under similar circumstances
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•

Extrapolation inferences extend the interpretation even further from the generalized
performance domain into a “trait” being assessed

•

Implication inferences extend the interpretation to include verbal descriptions of scores,
and claims or suggestions those descriptions might imply (“Average,” for example)

•

Decision inferences link scores to decisions or actions and their consequences
(intentional or otherwise)

•

Theory-based inferences extend to interpretation to address (presumed) underlying
mechanisms, properties, and/or relationships that account for the particular of the
observed performance

•

Technical inferences address the appropriateness of assessor assumptions about technical
issues such as the equivalence of performance forms, the extent of scaling, and the fitness
of statistical models, techniques, and assumptions

Of these seven (or perhaps six, as Kane is occasionally inclined to fold implication inferences
into decision inferences and/or technical inferences at various times in his discourse), the first
three – scoring, generalization, and extrapolation inferences – are involved in nearly all
interpretative arguments, following Kane’s model (Moss et al., 2006).
Only with the interpretive argument firmly in place should we proceed to the validity
argument, the purpose of which is to evaluate not the assessment per se, but the relevant
interpretive argument of the assessment. Kane (2006) notes that some of the inferences of an
interpretive argument may be taken for granted – such as “students can read the question” – but
that others will need more careful evaluation – such as “the achievement test covers the content
domain,” which Kane duly notes is nearly always questionable (p. 23). As a hardline
epistemologist and systems analyst however, I am inclined to question each and every
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assumption equally. In my experience it is unwise to assume anything about student ability and
preparedness; sometimes it is the case that students cannot in fact read (with the expected level
of understanding) the question, and to that extent, precursory remedial pedagogy may be called
for.
Nonetheless, as Moss et al. (2006) explain:
Consistent with its heritage in a naturalist or unified approach to social science, validity
theory in educational measurement supports the development and evaluation of
interpretations based on standardized forms of assessment that are intended to be
generalizable – meaningful and useful – across relevant individuals and contexts. Validity
research is conducted, in part, to ascertain the extent to which such generalizations may
be warranted. (p. 118)
Thus, if we understand the correspondence between the constructs grounding a particular
rubric’s discrete criteria and the interpretive argument(s) that are foundational to considerations
of an assessment’s validity, we have the basis for generalizing – and therefore implicitly also
establishing the reliability of – an assessment technology. Reliability and generalizability may
then be conceived of as being derivations of validity. I should note that this framework does not
guarantee the converse dependency: reliability and generalizability do not in and of themselves
yield validity. Reliability and generalizability may occur accidentally as a consequence of
rigorous (re)design (as above in Harris, 1986); validity, however, essentially produces them, and
therefore is more fundamental to the assessment process in general.
Returning to Messick’s Validity Framework then, if the evidential basis for test
interpretation is the starting point for the validation process, the validation process should
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subsequently turn to address, in order, both the evidential basis for test use and the consequential
basis of validity. Moss et al. (2006) note that:
…validity inquiries are always situated within a particular social context and guided by
the problem, issue, or question one is trying to address and the available resources
(evidence, conceptual tools) for addressing it. (p. 129)
In addition to the aforementioned practices, this second-order process of situated inquiry
examining uses and consequences may rely on hermeneutics and sociocultural studies,
respectively.
Hermeneutics has its origin in textual analysis, but in recent years has been extended to
cover pretty much any social phenomenon, including histories and cultures. “Hermeneutics is
about the theory and practice of interpretation, about the bringing of understanding into
language” (Moss et al., 2006, p. 130), and as such, it functions as a specific philosophical tool for
analyzing phenomenological ontologies (as indeed might be expected, given that hermeneutics
itself is an applied outgrowth of traditional phenomenology). Formally, hermeneutics is
concerned with the “meaning” of a “text,” but that analysis extends far beyond mere
considerations of the denotative cognitive content in instances of subject-predicate grammar. As
a second-order consideration, hermeneutics also examines the particular vocabulary, usage
conventions, implicit assumptions, values, author voice, and community standards of word
choices and uses, paragraphs construction, and rhetoric. As a third-order consideration,
hermeneutics also considers the intended audience and the social context which a “text” is
presented to and within. Without digressing into more-granular detail here, suffice it to say that
the conventions of hermeneutics represent another vetting tool that educators can use in the
validation process, if desired.
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Likewise, sociocultural studies may be characterized as examining “relations among the
person, activity, and situation, as they are given in social practice” (Lave, 1993, p.7). This broad
definition may be concentrated in educational assessment to considerations of learning
environment, community of practice, or activity system (Moss et al., 2006). Wertsch (1998)
identifies the learning environment as encompassing “the relationships between human action,
one the one hand, and the cultural, institution[al], and historical situations in which this action
occurs, on the other” (p. 23). Lave and Wenger (1991) in turn describe (somewhat reflexively) a
community of practice as “a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in
relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice” (p. 98), noting that the
analytical tools are “artifacts – physical, linguistic, and symbolic” (p. 57). Finally, Engeström
(1999) identifies an activity system as using some form of mediated activity (such as an
assessment scenario) to “explicate the societal and collaborative nature” (p. 30) of the actions
under examination.
All of these theoretical perspectives represent different approaches to the same, central
undertaking of ascertaining meaning in assessment scenarios. To simply the framework
somewhat, Messick (1989) helpfully provides a general summary of the process and relations,
crossing them in two dimensions he refers to as “facets” of validity inquiry (p. 20) and
reproduced here (adapted from Brown, 2000):
Table 1. Messick’s facets of test validity
Test Score Interpretation

Test Score Use

Evidential Basis

Construct Validity

Construct Validity + Relevance and Utility

Consequential Basis

Value Implications

Social Consequences
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The first facet (the columns) addresses the function/outcome of testing and therefore
distinguishes between interpretation and use in the evidential basis for validity. The second facet
(the rows) focuses on the justifications for testing, and therefore distinguishes between the
appraisal of evidence and the appraisal of consequence(s) (Moss et al., 2006). In this matrix,
construct validity is presented as defined by Messick (1989) to be the theoretical context of
implied relationships to other constructs, whereas relevance and utility are defined as the
theoretical contexts of (external) applicability and usefulness (cf. Brown, 2000). Value
implications are defined as the contexts of implied relationships of performance scores to
good/bad, desirable/undesirable, and similar judgments, whereas the social consequences are
defined as the value contexts of implied consequences of test use and the tangible effects of
applying the test. Messick notes that this matrix is progressive, in the sense that construct
validity appears in each of the four cells, explicitly or otherwise. In this way, construct validity
serves as the foundational, “integrating force” in validity inquiry (p. 20).
Given the highly context-dependent nature of even the most theoretically-grounded
validation process, there is arguably no single best approach to evaluating construct validity.
Brown (2000) gives a non-exhaustive list of suggestions that includes correlation coefficients,
factor analysis, ANOVA studies, and mixed-mode studies, to name but a few. Since a program
employing multiple analytical techniques to investigate construct validity can consume a
significant amount of resources – especially time and money – is it fitting and perhaps ironic that
assessment developers engaged in the validation process can benefit more from concentrating
upon the quality of their inquiries instead of the raw quantity of such. The key takeaway here is
that construct validation relies fundamentally upon assessors carefully drawing inferences –
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making an “informed leap” in each case from an observed, measured value to an estimate of
underlying standing on a construct (Cizek, 1997).
Addressing the application of all this apparatus of validity theory to assessment praxis,
Moss (2007) then asks the crystallizing question: “…what is being validated: a test, or an
interpretation and use of test scores?” (p. 473). Lissitz and Samuelsen (2007) object to Messick’s
argument that validity resides entirely outside of the test itself, concerned that Messick’s
approach essentially ignores the context within which the test/instrument is conceived and
constructed – yet the externality of validity is a position that Cronbach (1971) also champions:
One validates, not a test, but an interpretation of data arising from a specified procedure.
A single instrument is used in many different ways… Since each application is based on
a different interpretation, the evidence that justifies one application may have little
relevance to the next. Because every interpretation has its own degree of validity, one can
never reach the simple conclusion that a particular test “is valid.” (p. 447)
In this view, the test itself is not centrally important, as it is merely a tool to be used. How and
why the test is used, and to what use it is put are the far more salient questions for validity theory.
Therefore, appeals to the circumstances of an instrument’s source are considered to be either a
form of red herring fallacy that diverts attention from consequences to origins, or a form of false
cause fallacy that asserts an incorrect origin for the phenomenon (i.e., the validity of an
instrument is in truth not specifically contingent upon its origin). This is a subtle point, and it has
generated significant debate in the literature. As I see it, the confusion arises from the fact that on
the one hand, it is essential to systematically approach the design of an assessment instrument in
order to instill a predilection for yielding validity (and consequently reliability) in it, but on the
other hand, validity can only be ascertained by a posteriori analysis and examination of the
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instrument’s application. This, in my view, is precisely what drives the need to continually reevaluate qualitative instruments; no instrument (qualitative or otherwise, but especially
qualitative) ever springs forth a priori fully-formed and perfect from its creator(s), and validity
is, as a matter of practice, only ascertainable empirically and externally to the instrument, as part
of the overall technology of an assessment program. The methodology I have presented above is
intended to facilitate the development of valid qualitative instruments by design, but it can never
effectively guarantee the validity of an instrument (here, a rubric) as such; the validation process
will always require appropriate reflection and analysis after the fact. I am merely looking to
streamline the process and not only reduce the labor input required in the assessment process, but
also avoid what software engineers used to refer to as “Garbage In, Garbage Out” results in
assessment programs. In effect, instead of offering simple checklist, by digging into the
underlying theory and analyzing it with an eye toward application I am asserting that a
systematic approach – as complex or simple as may be deemed appropriate by the stakeholders –
is necessary for both success and efficiency in the assessment process, especially when working
in the realm of the qualitative.
Other Practical Considerations for Reliability
Beyond a firm and fundamental theoretical grounding in validity theory, reliability
requires – in addition to an empirical, field-test-based program of revision – a well-designed and
well-maintained process of calibration (Chun, 2010). In the context of assessment, calibration is
an arguably unique criterion in that it is focused on those who are doing the assessing, rather than
those who are being assessed or even the instrument used to assess them. Calibration provides
the other essential component of reliability, as it provides a check, external to the assessment
task the subject is performing, against the normative values the instrument scores against.
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For example, although a consistent phenomenological ontology is a presumed feature of a
properly-devised and properly-revised rubric, calibration is necessary to ensure that different,
individual raters apply that rubric consistently between different test subjects and over different
groups and sessions (A. Myatt, personal communication, Spring 2012). Even experienced raters
can become “rusty” within a short time frame (a week is often sufficient to degrade rater
performance), and a few simple calibration exercises prior to a session of rating can quickly
normalize the practice of scoring, whether raters are using a scoring guide rubric or a moredetailed multi-level rubric (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012).
Normalization from calibration is a necessary part of qualitative assessment applications
to ensure scoring consistency absent the presence of a standardized quantitative structure to a
rubric, yet the literature to address this issue is surprisingly sparse. On the one hand, this may be
due to the implicit assumption (perhaps a typical one) that providing a scoring scale within the
rubric itself is sufficiently-quantitative to guarantee a normalized structure to the assessment, yet
on the other hand, as construct validity is not an explicitly-objective entity and requires empirical
examination to confirm its presence, we have no unequivocal reason to expect such a guarantee
to arise necessarily. Furthermore, given that it is human nature for an individual’s cognitive
performance to vary over time as a result of both internal and external factors, prudence dictates
that we take such variability into account when we undertake a rating session.
It is this variability (or less charitably, “fallibility”) among human raters that has driven
recent research into using automated computer systems, employing various schemes of artificial
intelligence and/or pattern recognition, to attempt to supplant humans in the role of raters/scorers
for assessment programs. Unfortunately, these attempts to mechanize the process have yet to
really demonstrate reliability (Stross, 2012; S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012).
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Without delving into all the technical details, it is sufficient to note that the current approaches to
automating qualitative assessment focus primarily upon textual essays and tend to rely upon
statistical modeling of the text to evaluate the likelihood of the content being cognitively
meaningful. Unfortunately, despite the enthusiastic optimism of its proponents, this approach is
still easily “gamed” due to the inherent cognitive limitations of the model (Winerip, 2012). The
problem arises not from the fact that the statistical modeling itself is somehow unsound, but from
the fact that language, as per the theoretical perspectives mentioned above, is often (and easily)
highly-charged with what is colloquially known as “meta-content,” in reference to all the
contextual elements that give language (and language use) its full meaning, in the cognitive,
phenomenological, psychological, sociological, circumstantial, political, and construct validity
sense(s) of the word. For illustration, I have included a landmark example of this problem,
recently written by Les Perelman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as Appendix C.
Statistical modeling by itself alone is purely top-down, and cannot address the fundamental
bottom-up requirements of construct validity as I have laid them out. As mentioned earlier in this
essay, statistics can yield only measurement, not meaning, and some additional apparatus of a
phenomenological nature is required for proper (valid, reliable, useful) qualitative assessment:
also as above, the analysis of content is a separate and more-complex task than the analysis of
form.5 Statistics are not, by themselves, inferences, and unless/until technologists can produce a
5

This is a case of a “P versus NP problem” for computer science. Since construct validity

can verified in polynomial time (by humans), the unanswered-at-present research question for
software engineers and computer scientists is whether or not construct validity can be solved in
polynomial time (by a Turing Machine algorithm, for example). For further background on this
issue, see the historical survey in Auerbach (2012).
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cybernetic, mechanized system to undertake this additional dimension of assessment, it will still
fall to humans to supply the contextual analysis that gives insight into meaning, truth, and
learning.
There are more practical alternatives to automated rating, however, to ensure
calibration’s inter-rater reliability. Whereas specific measures of IRR may be quantitatively
analyzed using statistics such as Cohen’s kappa (in the case of two raters) and Fliess’ kappa (in
the case of two or more raters), or the broader Krippendorf’s alpha (comparing coded data to
rated scores), the important point here is that such measures should be made possible by any
given assessment program in the first place. In addition to having a basic, grounded validity, a
qualitative assessment technology will provide the highest reliability when multiple raters assess
the same performance task of the same subject(s) (Krippendorf, 1970; Krippendorf, 2004).
Experience – and the existence of Cohen’s kappa as a distinct calculation separate from Fliess’
kappa – indicate that pairs of raters can provide an optimum trade-off in labor costs (typically,
time rather than money) and scoring consistency (cf. López, 2002). Thus, raters performing
qualitative assessments should ideally be grouped into randomly-assigned, then randomlyreassigned-often scoring pairs, as this will tend to preserve the initial calibration of a rating
session for the duration of that session (S. Flaschka, personal communication, Spring 2012).
This integrated approach to design, usage, and evaluation ultimately works because the
reliability of a rubric lies not in the instrument itself, but in the raters and the inferences involved
in its usage.
Concerns are sometimes raised and debates are sometimes sparked among assessors over
the question of whether or not to provide students with access to a rubric before the students
attempt the performance task. At issue is the potential problem of students specifically tailoring
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their performances to meet the explicit expectations delineated in the rubric’s scoring levels. As I
see it, the existence of such a perceived problem may be taken as being more indicative of some
shortfalls in the alignment between the instrument and the intended learning outcomes than of a
difference of perspective on pedagogy. If proper content validity has been pursued in the design
and evolution of a rubric (as above), then what is really at issue here are the purposes to which
the assessment/instrument is being put.
Although there are well-established pedagogical schools of thought that emphasize
discovery processes and educational constructivism within the learner (which I endorse, as
above), telling students what we want them to learn should not invalidate the assessment process;
if it does, then the construct validity of the assessment instrument may be suspect, and revision
of the rubric in use – or even the learning outcomes – may be called for. Only in cases of
rigorously-applied Socratic Method do we find pedagogical scenarios and circumstances that
leverage keeping the students in the dark at the outset into advantages for the intended outcome.
Indeed, when students have the opportunity to provide feedback to those who have taught and
assessed them, one especially salient, emergent theme is that of seeking to understand the
expectations teachers have of them as students (Stevens & Levi, 2005; OECD, 2010).
Given the primacy of student-teacher relationships to the efficacy of the educational
enterprise, we should be careful of undermining the essential trust in one’s mentor(s) that such
relationships rely upon; as educators, it is generally not our purpose to conceal things from our
students, except in those cases where self-driven-discovery is part of a pre-identified learning
outcome. As assessment per se is not in and of itself a learning outcome, the only purpose
concealing assessment criteria beforehand can possibly serve is another, perhaps tacit learning
outcome. This second-order outcome is then the proper subject of a second-order assessment
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once the second-order outcome is revealed. Theoretically, this compounding process could be
repeated ad infinitum, but we would eventually expect the students to learn anticipate it (cf.
“enlightenment”) and thus rob it of its effectiveness (which, of course, could serve as yet a thirdorder learning outcome). In this way, when done correctly, initially obscuring the assessment
criteria as part of a pedagogy derived from the Socratic Method can yield paradigm-shifting
insights in the learner; overusing assessment-as-content-delivery, however, risks such a
technology becoming detrimental to student engagement.
Leadership and Management Considerations
Although I have not made the role of leadership explicit in the previous sections of this
chapter, as I now move from an examination of the conceptual and measurement issues to turn
my attention toward the organizational and political ones, as a practical matter, its role must now
become central. From the organizational (and by implication, the institutional) perspective, the
major issues for programs of qualitative assessment come down to ones of cost (Ewell & Jones,
1985) and culture (Shipman, Aloi, & Jones, 2003), and addressing these issues necessarily
expands the considerations more broadly outward from applied instructional practice, and thus
embraces the more-immediate involvement of institutional administrators at various levels with
the assessment process.
Barely one year after Ewell (1984) offers assurances that assessment does not require a
“massive” increase in costs (as above), he acknowledges (Ewell & Jones, 1985) that there will be
incremental costs involved in implementing updated, modernized assessment programs.
Specifically, amid calls to “measure your mission” (p. 6) administrators of assessment programs
must successfully address different cost considerations, some of them common to all
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administrative programs (especially educational ones) and some of them unique to assessment
processes (especially student-centric ones).
The most obvious of these varied concerns are the direct costs such as those associated
with deploying a new assessment instrument and/or technology for any given assessment project,
as well as those associated with the analysis of the results of that project. As with most itemized
costs, these are largely inescapable, yet administrators need to properly anticipate and control
them. It is this aspect of assessment projects that my analysis is most closely aimed at in the end;
my theoretical model of what makes for “better” qualitative assessment is intended to facilitate a
framework of methodological understanding that in turn allows assessors to realistically estimate
the time, labor, and material that will be required, especially in contrast to legacy and/or
traditionally-qualitative assessment programs. One of the key points that Ewell and Jones stress
is that this cost represents a regular, ongoing investment, and not a one-time expenditure, and
therefore assessment must be conceived of and understood as a continual process that adds value
to the institutional mission, and not as an occasional, only-as-externally-required activity (p. 7).
Hand-in-hand with the direct costs are the indirect costs of implementation, and these are
largely dominated by matters of overhead. Although Ewell and Jones (1985) do not address it in
much detail, implicit in the framework of “overhead” is the notion of opportunity cost that may
be measured in terms of faculty and administrative professional time spent on the tasks of
assessment instead of other service/teaching/research activities. This investment choice extends
to both the time spent on the analysis of specific assessments themselves as well as time
subsequently spent on program reviews and revisions as a consequence of the results of
assessment analysis. There is, not surprisingly, no straightforward, tested, theoretically-grounded
formula appearing anywhere in the literature that gives either a simple rule of thumb or a precise
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calculus of how to establish the parameters of either of these cost issues in an assessmentspecific context, and it is unclear if such a thing would even be useful; in practice, budgeting is
more of an art than a science, and although each institution must weigh the costs and benefits of
assessment for itself and in light of its own mission and intended outcomes, if the factors are well
understood, the resource needs may be reasonably-well anticipated (Ewell & Jones, 1985).
For planning purposes, costs may be considered from three perspectives, each with a
different analytical purpose. Full cost represents the total project requirements for all stages and
elements, and is the last perspective to consider, as it directly affects budgetary concerns.
Average costs represent per unit costs (e.g., per student, per faculty member) within the context
of higher-order units, and typically inform variables used to calculate full costs. The most
important perspective, however, are marginal or incremental costs (Ewell & Jones, 1985).
Marginal costs depend upon the unit of analysis (per student, per faculty member, and here, even
per program) much in the same way that average costs do, but are far more important to
forecasting, as they may vary non-linearly. For example, economies of scale may provide very
small marginal increases in cost when a technology is more-widely employed – once the host
platform is installed and being maintained in operational condition, storing 100,000 student
electronic portfolios will cost only slightly more than storing 100 of them – whereas the amount
of staff time required to assess a large body of task outputs may incur increasingly-significant
opportunity costs as other activates/responsibilities are progressively neglected – a faculty
member can effectively and reliably grade a dozen or two term papers in a weekend without
falling significantly behind in other duties, but a department will be unable to retroactively assess
all writing samples collected from all sections of a core-curriculum course in the last five years
and still balance a full semester’s academic workload without some outside assistance. A clear
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understanding of the complexities of these matters and their consequences for resource allocation
is essential to exercise effective administration over them.
To assist in that understanding, for accounting/budgeting purposes cost elements may be
grouped into four distinct categories for consideration (Ewell & Jones, 1985). First among these
are the costs of the instrument itself. In qualitative assessments, instruments are usually
developed from within the institution (as per the guidelines I have set out above), rather than
being externally licensed. As such, and as with all of these elements as applied to qualitative
assessment programs, the costs tend to be dominated by considerations of the measure of faculty
time involved. Unique to this particular element however is the fact that qualitative instruments
require an ongoing investment of (human) resources to operate and maintain, given the necessary
process of continual evaluation and revision that they require in comparison to the convenience
of prepackaged, conventional quantitative, externally-acquired assessment instruments that
typically incur either one-time or (occasional, depending upon licensing details) fixed-recurring
costs.
Second in this consideration are the costs of administering the assessment. In the case of
internally-developed instruments such as rubrics employed in a performance task assessment,
this cost is fairly linear when scaled, and is usually allocated on a per student basis. For present
purposes, it is most telling and germane that Ewell (1984) recognizes that all instruments
intended to assess critical thinking are local in origin, as they are highly dependent upon context
and curricular delivery.
Third are the costs of the analysis of the assessment, and this is the point where costs
require the most management (Ewell & Jones, 1985). Analysis encompasses both the study of
student performance with respect to the intended outcomes as well as examining the reliability of
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the technology and considerations of potential revisions to the instrument and/or both the
assessment and the instructional programs. Without effective management toward a clear set of
goals, these activities can consume an ever-increasing, uncontrolled amount of resources, as well
as produce diminishing returns on resource investment, and combined, this can constitute a
highly-undesirable program outcome.
Fourth are the costs of coordination among all the program and institutional elements
involved, and this cost is often the most underestimated. Again, insightful management is called
for, as this element perhaps most of all is rife with potential for wasteful expenditures. To this
point, Ewell and Jones recommend several administrative tactics to control the various costs
associated with any assessment program that encompass all four of these budgetary elements.
At the outset of any assessment program, it is useful to begin by taking an inventory of
what assessment data may already be already available on students, programs, and the institution,
in order to avoid any needless duplication of previous efforts (and, I would add sanguinely,
needless repetition of previous mistakes). This pre-existing assessment data may have been taken
for a variety of (other) purposes, but is often not centralized nor indexed for easy availability.
Studying this data can inform not only the administrative planning of the new assessment
program, but can also shape its ontological structure, its sought outcomes, and its design and
implementation details.
In addition to being a goal of the inventory process, good administrative oversight of all
parts of an assessment program avoids duplication of effort, particularly between different
institutional departments and divisions (or, in the vernacular, “units”). Although a bottom-up
approach to qualitative assessment requires a decentralized structure to function correctly (as
explained above), it is the proper role of centralized, top-down administration to maximize the
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efficiency of concurrent programs across the institution. Modern leadership theory (discussed in
more detail below) suggests that facilitating communication is a more-effective strategy in
pursuit of this goal than taking a directly-controlling management role can be. The previouslymentioned communicative value of rubrics is highly germane to facilitating this course, and can
therefore provide an essential tool of intra-institutional (and inter-institutional, in accreditation
contexts) consolidation of resources and data.
Complimentary to these two preliminary undertakings, looking for mutually reinforcing
information is an essential task of program oversight, and one that may need to be driven by
institutional administrators absent a vested interest by departmental-level assessors. This
function is essential to the higher-level assessments of programs and institutions, but may also
inform the revision of assessment technologies at all levels.
Finally, Ewell and Jones (1985) note that “Careful tailoring of data collection to
instructional mission can limit costs” (p. 31, emphasis mine). Limiting the scope of assessment
programs largely to specifically-identified needs prevents overtaxing the finite (human)
resources of an institution, especially at the expense of scholarship and educational delivery.
Parallel to this budget-centric model, from the leadership perspective (focusing on
principally personnel considerations rather than principally financial ones) Banta and Blaich
(2011) characterize the process of effective outcome assessment programs in terms of three
successive stages: planning, implementation, and improving and sustaining. In the initial
planning stage, good leadership involves all stakeholders from the outset of the program in order
to address their respective needs/interests in exchange for their later support of the program.
It is important for the planning stage, which should begin once the need for assessment is
formally recognized, to allow sufficient time for a plan to be developed that has clear purposes
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articulated and directly relates to the goals of the respective stakeholders. Establishing welldefined, unambiguous, and explicitly-stated program goals is a necessary prerequisite to program
success when large and diverse interests are involved. This is not to say that assessment
programs cannot necessarily have open-ended goals, but the expectations for and values of such
goals will need to be well understood by all concerned if they are to be realistically pursued. As a
noteworthy aside regarding the specific issue of faculty involvement in assessment programs,
Ewell mentions elsewhere that leaders should “remember that you don’t need everybody on
board to move forward” (Hutchings, 2010, p. 3), and although this may be true in so far as it
goes, prudence dictates that consensus is still highly desirable even when it is elusive or
impractical (due to issues of resistance based upon individualized notions of academic freedom,
for example; more on this below), and in practical matters of non-faculty externalities such as
appropriation/grant/funding requirements, legislative mandates, governance directives, and the
like, consensus with, and even among, external stakeholders may be an imposed prerequisite.
Banta and Blaich (2011) most extensively emphasize the role of leadership in the
implementation stage of an assessment project. It is in the implementation that the details and
complexities of an assessment project pose the most challenges to its success, and where
maintaining the engagement of the various stakeholders – particularly the faculty – can be most
difficult. To this end, helping everyone involved remain mindful that assessment is central to
learning and is therefore in everyone’s interest, providing professional development
opportunities for involved faculty and staff, and providing good communication among the
various stakeholder constituencies can all become crucial to the efficiency and efficacy of the
program. Likewise, good leadership also attends to the practical, technological needs of the
assessment, placing responsibility at the unit (typically, departmental) level (and consequently
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allowing units to exercise that responsibility) while also seeking to facilitate sufficient validity
and reliability of the assessment (thereby ensuring its utility). Throughout this stage, leadership
should likewise facilitate the assessment of processes along with that of outcomes, so that
outcome assessment can also serve as program assessment.
Finally, leadership is essential in the ongoing process of improving and sustaining an
assessment program, in terms of both the assessment technology itself, as well as that of the
overall program. Even in cases where a program generates a large amount of enduring
momentum internally without continual external motivation, leaders need to nurture even that
process.
The single most important factor for leaders to address in assessment programs is
engaging the faculty (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Governance issues notwithstanding, faculty
engagement is the cornerstone of the entire assessment process, and without nurturing and
securing it, assessment programs simply cannot be effective (Terenzini, 1989). Specifically, “If
faculty do not participate in making sense of and interpreting assessment evidence, they are
much more likely to focus solely on finding fault with the conclusions than on considering ways
that the evidence might be related to their teaching” (Banta & Blaich, 2011, p. 24). Engaging the
students follows as a close second (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Many, if not most, assessment
programs are driven by accreditation concerns, and students, who are often already challenged
by the need to engage with their institutions, may feel even less inclined to engage with external
mandates presented to their institutions.
Less directly-relevant to issues of leadership, but even more important to my analysis, is
the historically high turnover rate in faculty and administrative leadership that assessment
programs are prone to (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Banta and Blaich report (or perhaps “lament”)
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that “using evidence to promote improvements is not yet a core institutional function” (p. 26). As
a consequence of this “churn” (again borrowing from the common vernacular) in leadership,
assessment programs that are both long-running and successful are extraordinarily difficult to
find examples of. This, finally, strikes at the root of the problem I pointed to in earlier chapters:
assessment – particularly formative and summative qualitative assessment – must be improved
upon somehow, even in light of internal and external factors that cannot be directly countered.
Furthermore, although Banta and Blaich (2011) are somewhat coy in addressing it,
experience confirms that high turnover rates in leadership within the institution combine with
short election cycles outside the institution to create immense political pressure on institutions to
demonstrate short-term gains, even at the expense of long-term ones. The resulting unrealistic
timelines for change driven by a persistent external insistence on “accountability” within the
institution can lead to faculty frustration, resistance, and even outright rebellion (as above). This
response in turn then fosters stronger calls for accountability as the next election cycle looms,
and thus sows strife within the broader community of stakeholders, resulting in an increase in
conflict rather than in communication.
It should be noted that it is also possible for assessment program administrators to lack
the necessary professional confidence or decisiveness to implement assessment-indicated
changes in curricula, pedagogy, and/or departments based on a (mis-)perceived lack of
sufficiently ample and reliable data upon which to base expensive and perhaps unpopular
decisions (Banta & Blaich, 2011). Sometimes, as a consequence of intra-institutional 9and even
intra-departmental) politics, administrators may find it easier to suggest “further study” of a
problem than to actually solve it – especially when one will be moving on in a couple of years
anyway, and would therefore wish to avoid needlessly antagonizing one’s colleagues by
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implementing unwelcome, assessment-driven changes to the status quo. This is not a prescription
for a successful assessment program outcome, as it fails to address and resolve what is perhaps
the single most formidable obstacle an assessment program may face.
Ewell (1984) anticipates this, however, and identifies two distinct motivations for faculty
resistance:
A first reason for resistance is a fear on the part of the faculty that they will be negatively
evaluated. A second basis is more philosophical: a conviction that the outcomes of what
they do in the classroom are inherently unmeasurable by anyone but the faculty. (p. 78)
Ewell goes on to explain that part of the first problem stems from the tendency of the faculty to
confuse/conflate assessments of program effectiveness with course or teaching evaluations –
instruments that are widely considered to be highly prone to biases that make them unreliable.
Therefore, for leaders in either the faculty or the administration, it is essential to place the focus
of an assessment program clearly and unambiguously on the curriculum itself and nowhere else,
involving the faculty intimately and from the outset by communicating and sustaining this goal
to them and with them.
Ewell (1984) also notes that
Faculty resistance based upon fear of negative evaluation is often heavily bound up with
more basic objections to measurement of any kind. Many faculty are simply
philosophically opposed to explicit outcomes measurement. They feel that it is inherently
misleading, oversimplifying, or inaccurate. Moreover, many faculty believe that
assessments designed to tap general attributes do not adequately reflect the specific
emphases that the feel are present in their classrooms. (p. 79)
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Here, then, the role of qualitative assessment through the mechanism of construct-valid rubrics
may find its fundamental utility: providing meaning to learning and learning outcomes instead of
mere measurement of them.
Ewell (1984) observes that teaching and scholarship are “fragile” practices that operate at
their best within a decentralized and values-based context, insulated from an overarchingly
instrumental environment (p. 13). In addition, he specifically asserts
…that to achieve excellence in the diverse activities currently comprising postsecondary
education, we must create explicit, institution-specific mechanisms for regularly
assessing the degree to which we are in fact attaining our collective goals. (p. 13)
Further on, Ewell consequently notes
The challenge to [the] administration… is to create explicit, information-based structures
of incentives and accountability to replace our more traditional implicit methods of selfassessment and self-improvement. (p. 15)
Ewell’s subsequent claim that the effectiveness of assessment programs “is highly dependent
upon their being institution-specific and participatory in character” (p. 17) is much more in line
with recent experiences reported in the literature. Ultimately, I think this last quote reveals that
Ewell implicitly recognizes the necessarily “bottom-up” quality the assessment must have, even
if he is couching his presentation from the administrative-managerial perspective.
Faculty Matters
However, as alluded to previously, a major critique of higher education faculty, dating
back to at least the 1970s, is their widespread, determined – even obstinate – resistance to change
(Tagg, 2012). Tagg identifies a double standard, “in which quality only becomes a question
when contemplating change and no comparative evidence ever emerges” (para. 6) that is often
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used by faculty committees to terminate proposed revisions by citing undocumented concerns
about maintaining a nebulous notion of “educational quality.” Thus, in perfect irony, preserving
the assumed quality of a curriculum or pedagogy is often cited as a reason to oppose a new-andtherefore-somehow-disruptive formal assessment of the quality of that particular curriculum or
pedagogy. Naturally then, aspiring reformers should always couch their issues in terms of
assessing how teachers can help students learn better, for this framing tactic is difficult to
oppose in purely abstract or non-evidential ways.
Tagg (2012) advises would-be reformers that, because of the natural human proclivity
toward biological and psychological homeostasis, change most often comes in response to
external stimuli. Therefore, the implementation of a process of designed change – a change that
deliberately alters the rules of an activity for some specific purpose – becomes necessary for
facilitating reform (para. 12).
Tagg (2012) also observes that developments in psychology over last the one hundred
years or so have led to the modern understanding that people do not make choices from a purelyrational analysis that seeks the optimum outcome (i.e., John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern’s expected utility theory), but rather that people make choices based upon highlysubjective perceptions of value (i.e., Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect theory)
that are conceived of as relative gains or losses as measured from some chosen or provided
reference point. Though I note that this process is especially prone to logical fallacies and
therefore should not be considered reliable, it is unfortunately also a descriptive phenomenon in
that is an observed default behavior in humans. As a direct consequence of this behavioral
phenomenon, how choices are framed in terms of potential gains and losses can introduce a
significant bias into how the decision of which choice would be preferable is arrived at. Whereas
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semanticists might quibble over the specific phraseology used in some of the textbook examples
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (2000), the general finding that people are risk-averse when
choices and outcomes are presented in terms of gains, but risk-seeking when the exact same
choices and outcomes are presented in terms of losses has been well-documented in subsequent
research (see Tagg, 2012, for further background).
The leadership implications for educational reformers are then clear: faculty are only
human, and presenting assessment programs to faculty as an opportunity for institutional gain is
a recipe for failure, as naturally risk-averse mindset is likely to take hold within the faculty, and
thereby give rise to a defense of the status quo no matter how unfounded such a defense might
actually be. Once this mindset is in place, at least for American subjects, the Dunning-Kruger
Effect can also come into play (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), causing the subjects to cling to their
mindset even more stubbornly when presented with contrary evidence, out of fear of admitting
(to themselves and others) that their initial reasoning was erroneous and of consequentially
losing social and political capital within their peer group from this show of weakness.6

6

There is some evidence reported in the literature of the Dunning-Kruger Effect being

reversed in Asian cultures. In such cultures, social and political capital is often gained by
promoting group harmony rather than by asserting dominance over the group, and therefore the
sometimes highly-ritualized public admission of mistakes and errors – often requiring prescribed
acts of contrition – is considered virtuous and valuable. See DeAngelis (2003) for more details,
and note that the cultural implications of this difference extend to many leadership contexts, but
that the main point regarding biases addressed from prospect theory and framing still holds
across all studied cultures.
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In addition to this cognitive and social obstacle from prospect theory, Tagg (2012)
identifies another psychological effect that operates as a corollary of loss aversion, pointing to
what Thaler (1980) describes as the endowment effect. In essence, the endowment effect operates
to tacitly and subjectively assign a higher value to things which the subject already possesses,
further driving risk aversion even when risk may not be present, and in the extreme causing some
subjects to embrace a net loss by choosing to keep what they have possession of even when they
can be guaranteed to obtain something of greater objective value in exchange for it (Ariely,
2008). Together, loss aversion and the endowment effect add up to what Tagg (2012) labels the
status quo bias, borrowing from Kahneman and Tversky (2000) to characterize it as a perceptual
illusion rather than a computational error. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) suggest the status
quo bias results from an attempt to resolve the cognitive dissonance that may surround
estimations of one’s own worth as a decision-maker, especially in light of the psychological need
to justify past decision-making and resolve indications of past errors with the present selfestimation of oneself as a good decision-maker. Thus, Tagg (2012) identifies the status quo bias,
which can occur at any level of an administrative hierarchy, as the principle obstacle for
designed change a the unit (here, the departmental faculty) level.
Summary
All the component pieces for a grounded theory to improve qualitative assessment
programs are now in place. From Terenzini, I have defined and delimited the fundamental
parameters of assessment that form both its conceptual and pragmatic foundations. From Ewell, I
have focused this framework upon modern educational contexts. From Stevens and Levi, I have
qualified and examined the instrumental issues qualitative assessments face, as well as how best
to address them in the integrated technology of rubrics, and from Messick I have delineated the
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necessary basis for establishing the construct validity of those rubrics. I have subsequently
looked to Kane and Moss et alia to further characterize the relevant inferences that may be
drawn to give insight into construct validity within the context of institutional mission. Then I
have looked to Ewell and Jones to examine and understand the nature of the costs associated
with assessment programs. Finally, I have turned to Banta and Blaich to describe and explain the
significant leadership issues that assessment programs face.
In the next and final chapter, I will bring all this together, with some further analysis and
some additional considerations, into my conclusions and recommendations.
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CHAPTER 5: ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, GENERAL CONCLUSIONS,
AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Overview
We should never lose sight of the fact that institutional change is the implicit goal of
assessment (Terenzini, 1989). To guide the institution of such changes, a general series of
recommendations for leadership in assessment programs has emerged in the literature, both in
the broader context of institutional management in any commercial or public scenario, and
within the specific context of higher education. The checklist provided to postsecondary
educators by Jones, Voorhees, and Paulson (2002) is a typical guide of this type, derived from a
mixed-methods study relying upon interviews and statistical analysis and sharing a large
commonality with the general professed wisdom on these matters, and so I shall use it as an
exemplar.
Jones et alia (2002) describe successful assessment leaders as
•

being directly involved in the assessment process

•

meeting regularly with assessment personnel

•

facilitating communication

•

establishing mutual trust

•

promoting collegial collaboration

•

providing real incentives for program participation and support

•

fostering a deliberate planning process
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•

pursuing slow, incremental changes to maximize the potential for success

•

integrate assessment and budgetary concerns

I note that none of these are particularly new to my analysis, but the crucial factor is that, as is
usual for this type of advice, Jones et alia support these conclusions from the perspective of trialand-error “best practices” rather than a grounded theory.
By examining the details of how and why qualitative assessment works the way it does,
considering the established challenges assessment programs pose for their leadership, and
applying some systems theory I can now provide a more-specific phenomenology to facilitate
qualitative assessment program success.
Motivations
As leaders, when considering how best to motivate others, we should always take into
account the others’ enlightened self-interest. Even the most altruistic of faculty members, the
ones most inclined to serve the public good of education even at significant personal cost, cannot
be expected to abandon the well-being of their careers completely. Central to this is the feedback
loop that has emerged in higher education wherein faculty who devote more time to research and
publishing are paid more than their teaching-oriented colleagues, and this brute fact holds across
the entire spectrum of postsecondary education (Fairweather, 1996). The feedback loop arises
because this discrepancy in emphasis inevitably has significant consequences for tenure and
promotion decisions (Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006), and thus a classic vicious circle forms
wherein teaching is systematically and continually devalued as a professional activity among
faculty in higher education. Tagg (2012) notes that “teaching load” has even begun to take on a
pejorative meaning, in that faculty increasingly view time spent on instruction as a net loss in
time that could otherwise be spent on research.
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The only way to offset this shift is for administrators to pursue initiatives that emphasize
excellence in teaching as being highly-relevant (or for the truly revolutionary, central) to tenure
considerations. There are a few scattered examples of such initiatives that can be found
referenced occasionally in the literature, but there is no evidence of widespread emphasis on
such reforms trending across the overall spectrum of higher education institutions; to date, such
initiatives appear to be the exception, rather than the rule (cf. Huber & Hutchings, 2005). This is
the issue that administrators must address first and foremost if any assessment program – but
most particularly a labor-intensive qualitative assessment program – is to be successful, or even
possible as a practical consideration. All other issues regarding the improvement of qualitative
assessment practices pale in comparison to the significance of this one.
In order to address this problem directly, it is necessary for administrative leaders in
higher education to confront the settings wherein the mechanisms of tenure and promotion
decisions principally reside in the loosely-coupled hierarchy that characterizes modern
institutions of higher education: the discipline-oriented departments. Discipline-centric
departments represent a double-edged sword academically; it may be viewed as scholastically
advantageous that a community of researchers sharing a common professional specialization can
work together under the appointed leadership of one of their peers toward the preservation and
expansion of their particular, chosen body of knowledge, but emphasizing the necessary
maintenance and advancement of their discipline and thereby themselves typically works against
the faculty fostering a general public competency in (or even a serviceable familiarity with) that
discipline through the mechanisms of education. Given the typical resource constraints under
which faculty must function, and the self-reinforcing emphasis on publishing under which
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faculty must survive, an “either/or” dilemma is created for the faculty in terms of how best to
apply their energies, and the resulting choices are predictably discipline- and career-centered.
A further complication to this situation is that higher education faculty may often lack
what I would describe as “sufficient” teaching experience, and may have only rudimentary
pedagogical skills. This can often be the result of graduate education programs that emphasize
the core competencies of research and publishing while leaving candidates to their own devices
in terms of developing instructional proficiency. This emphasis then becomes self-reinforcing as
successful academics subsequently carry this value system with them from graduate school to
new jobs at new institutions, where they pursue and are eventually granted tenure, preserving not
only the core knowledge of their disciplines, but also the traditional, scholarship-prioritizing
value system.
Ultimately, Tagg (2012) describes the prevailing wisdom in departments regarding
pedagogical improvement as “a morass in which gains would be invisible if achieved and in
which [faculty] can only lose time, money, and energy through vaguely configured efforts that
create no enduring value” (circa para. 47). I assert that it is therefore incumbent upon reformers
to address these specific conceptualizations frankly, explicitly, and proactively, for no resourceintensive program of qualitative assessment can succeed otherwise.
In the particular case of community colleges – and now, extended perhaps to the forprofits – where faculty carry heavier (often much heavier) teaching loads in exchange for a
release from research obligations, the single most valued resource instructors have is their
autonomy (Grubb, Worthen, Byrd, Webb, Badway, Case, Goto, & Villeneuve, 1999; Tagg,
2012). Even in cases of standardized curricula that are handed down to instructors who then
function as little more than tutors and graders in practice, the freedom of self-determination in
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instructional delivery forms a core value to these non-tenure-track faculty. Indeed, the more
locked-down and standardized a pedagogy becomes, the more preciously each small remaining
degree of academic freedom will be clung to, and each new encroachment is likely to be met
with increasingly-determined resistance, as per Darling-Hammond (1997) above.
In the particular case of adjuncts and other contingent faculty, leaders need to weigh the
increased inclination toward compliance with seemingly-capricious administrative directives that
can typify adjunct working conditions against the comparatively high turnover rates these faculty
members are prone to (from issues both inside and outside the institution’s control, which is a
separate topic entirely). Although it can be easier to implement an ongoing assessment program
when relying principally upon faculty who are less disposed than their tenure-track colleagues to
stubbornly defend a status quo – since the extant culture barely includes those adjuncts in the
first place – the accompanying high turnover rate among such faculty creates problems in itself
for developing and maintaining the validity of qualitative assessment technologies. Without
longitudinal participation from a steady quorum of expert faculty who themselves are directly
involved in a representative sample of the instructional delivery, each new round of program
assessment will essentially be starting over from scratch, and in the case of content-validitycontingent formative and summative qualitative assessment, this may be an especially
formidable obstacle to effectiveness as well as a major cost burden (Katz, 2010).
For administrative leaders, the key is to find ways to improve teaching and learning that
do not significantly impact the traditional path to tenure and promotion. Such innovations must
always be couched in terms that the faculty will perceive as not imposing a net loss upon what is
professionally valuable to them.
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Involving the Faculty in the Process of Change
Miller (2012) notes that there has been “a lot of backsliding” (p. 8) in higher education’s
acceptance of the need to assess and improve teaching and learning. She notes that the key to the
process is fostering “the curiosity of the faculty about the effects of their teaching” (p. 8).
Central to fostering faculty involvement in any change process is to establish ownership
of the process among them, for any change (from any source, external or internal) must have this
authenticity in order to be accepted (Ewell, 1984; Senge, 1990, Tagg, 2012). Among leadership
gurus, an apocryphally-sourced quote attributed to 20th Century author Antoine de SaintExupéry is frequently invoked to illuminate this cornerstone notion of modern leadership theory:
“If you want to build ship, don’t drum up people to collect wood and don’t assign them tasks and
work, but rather teach them to long for the endless immensity of the sea.”
Whereas it is perhaps overreaching to expect higher education faculty to ever “long” for
the emergence and growth of an institutional assessment culture that is dedicated to the
improvement of postsecondary teaching and learning, the essential, cornerstone question
remains: How does one foster and promote faculty involvement in, and ownership of, qualitative
assessment?
Tagg (2012) calls for an opening-up of the traditional faculty endowments – the vested
interests that serve as repositories of resources and value. The traditional linking of hiring,
promotion, and tenure decisions to disciplinary research needs to be, if not broken, at least
augmented with alternative linkages that do not undervalue teaching and learning and therefore
do not deter the faculty embrace of change. In addition, linking these same faculty endowments
to collaborative work instead of individual work will enable the faculty to perceive such work as
a gain in their respective endowments instead of a loss. Tagg also recommends that this
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collaboration be as large as possible, so that faculty involvement in the change process may be as
widespread and extensive as possible. To facilitate all of this, it is helpful to establish channels
outside of departments that allow faculty to build their endowments; the reasoning being that
modern institutional departments reinforce specialized research and individual autonomy, but if
these are the only paths for faculty development and endowment-building, they drive rigidity and
resistance to change.
All this sounds simple and straightforward enough, but the specifics are often elusive,
and there are other factors that these optimistic prescriptions for change seem to ignore.
Foremost among these is The Peter Principle (Peter & Hull, 1969). Simply stated, The Peter
Principle is the descriptive phenomenon that in a bureaucratic hierarchy, employees tend to rise
to the level of their incompetence. In practice, this means that employees – administrators in
particular – are typically promoted and assigned new responsibilities within an institution based
on their performance at the previous level of the hierarchy, rather than based on a demonstrated
aptitude for the new level of responsibility. Once an employee reaches a job level exceeding that
employee’s functional capabilities, promotion of the employee ceases, and the employee remains
in the hierarchy, attempting to function at a level beyond his or her abilities.
In the years since The Peter Principle was first popularized among management theorists,
little has been done to avoid it or alleviate the problems it creates. Indeed, the principle has now
been informally extended (by Laurence J. Peter himself) from personnel contexts into to
technological ones: The Generalized Peter Principle asserts that any working technology will
tend to be applied to progressively more challenging applications until it fails. Unlike personnel
scenarios, wherein employees may be retained in unsuitable positions (particularly in situations
where their incompetence protects those above them from having their own incompetence
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revealed), technology that is inadequate to a new application may often be discarded, rather than
simply being retained while remaining ineffective.
To address this from the perspective of qualitative assessment program leadership,
leaders must confront The Peter Principle in both its forms. From the human resources side,
although it is often preferable in non-postsecondary-education context to provide comfortablycompetent employees with salary increases instead of promotions, this is seldom suitable for
rank-conscious higher education faculty. The alternative solution then becomes essential:
employees must receive extensive training for new responsibilities prior to taking on those
responsibilities, so that any emergent incompetencies may be identified before the employee
(faculty member) is allowed to take on such new responsibilities. This crucial point is not
generally addressed in the advice to be found in the literature, as it clearly will increase the
resource costs necessary for implementing an assessment program, and yet, it appears to me to
be as essential to planning as any other item – arguably even more so if leaders want to facilitate
engagement with and ownership of the resource-intensive qualitative assessment process. As
faculty may often lack experience with qualitative assessment, it is vital to any program that
faculty be provided with the opportunity to first understand the technology, so that they may
consequently best consider how to implement, use, and draw inferences from it.
One of the most-often reported benefits of the assessment projects we run in the Ole Miss
Center for Writing and Rhetoric is giving hands-on, practical familiarity with using rubrics to our
graduate instructors. These instructors may have been exposed to rubrics when their own work
was previously graded using them, and they are guided to use rubrics in assessing their own
students’ learning, but these novice instructors are frequently impressed by how rubrics may also
be used in the overall program assessment we engage in regularly, and participation in that
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process expands and extends their understanding of the technology considerably. In effect, we
provide training in rubric use for program assessment that has benefits to our individual
instructors’ student assessments. Once we can persuade (with modest financial incentives) our
graduate students to invest the time in our program assessment, they are usually very interested
in participating in any future program assessment projects that are subsequently announced – not
merely for the small amount of extra money in their paychecks, but for the professional
development opportunity it provides.
The technological problem arising from the Generalized Peter Principle is simpler to
resolve than the more-basic, personnel-based one. Maintaining the validity of a qualitative
assessment technology (a rubric and its inferences) is already built in to the process of evaluating
and revising the rubric, and therefore it is a simple matter to evolve a rubric (or a rubric-based
program or institutional assessment) to meet any additional requirements or to examine
additional outcomes. The technology of rubric-based assessment never becomes obsolete.
When attempting to implement the leadership recommendations I have set out above, it
will be helpful for leaders to additionally bear in mind two opposing, yet compatible, models to
guide specific decision-making. The first of these is General Systems Theory (Von Bertalanffy,
1972). It is essential that leaders consider assessment programs from the perspective of systems
theory: a program should always be considered as an interconnected series of parts, each one of
which may affect any other part or even the functioning of the system as a whole. On the one
hand, this is the basis for the modern notion of a learning organization (Senge, 1990) which
seeks to leverage the skills and abilities of an institution’s members between and across the
divisions of the entire organization in an effort to maximize outcomes, but on the other hand, it
means that every decision to be implemented is likely to have repercussions anywhere and
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everywhere else within the project and the institution, and must therefore be understood in terms
of its place within the broader context. Although this task may be non-trivial, it is my aim to
have provided, in the previous chapters, the basis for both contextual and theoretical frameworks
to facilitate this analysis.
Foremost among these is the other principle that I recommend be used to guide decisionmaking: subsidiarity. Subsidiarity, especially as incorporated into European Union law, is the
principle that any organizational matter is best handled by the lowest, least-centralized level of
the organizational hierarchy that can effectively address that particular matter. As a demonstrated
precondition for effective qualitative assessment, bottom-up methodologies are required to
establish the content validity of rubric-based technologies of assessment. As a prerequisite for
program success, faculty engagement with and ownership of the process of assessment –
particularly resource-intensive qualitative assessment – is likewise crucial. The piece of advice to
administrators that I find missing in the literature is that pushing authority for decision-making as
far down the institutional hierarchy as it can functionally go is a tacit requirement for program
success, and is therefore and essential administrative philosophy. Not only does this reinforce the
tradition of shared governance when applied to higher education institutions, but it can guide
administrative processes beyond outcomes assessment.
Metarubrics
Finally, administrators should never lose sight of the fact that rubrics may be employed at
all levels of an assessment program, and may even be used to assess the effectiveness of other
rubrics. Using the methodological, conceptual, and managerial frameworks I have set out, a
rubric may be designed, used, and validated for any definable outcome at any institutional level.
The more pervasive rubric use becomes, not only inside the classroom, but at all levels of the
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institution, the more opportunities to understand meaningful higher education outcomes will be
created.
Final Perspective
Ultimately then, effective qualitative assessment is the result of effective rubrics being
combined with effective leadership and program management, and the importance of each of
these elements to the overall success of a qualitative assessment program cannot be understated.
Overall, for professional and intuitional development purposes, I have sought in this research to
solve the mystery of why qualitative assessment technologies are not as widespread as a
postsecondary educator might naïvely expect them to be, and thereby gain some insight into
rectifying the situation in a manner that improves educational delivery. In so doing, I have
identified what are, at least to me and my perspective yet hopefully to others’ as well, useful and
informative frameworks – both practical and theoretical – that have already demonstrated their
utility to the administrative challenges I have found myself grappling with regularly in support of
program assessment, especially as it is pertinent to institutional accreditation concerns.
Unguided research of the type upon which I have relied heavily in this study can itself be
a highly resource-intensive process, and I am fortunate to have been able to negotiate my way
into an opportunity to pursue my investigations at length. Going forward, it is now incumbent
upon me to promote and extend my findings. Rubrics are the easy part; I have found that the
mechanisms of effective rubric use are well-established, but the knowledge of how to use them
effectively is not, and therefore the need for dissemination of that knowledge is clear to me. It is
the leadership challenges that are the hard part of qualitative assessment; promoting and
facilitating faculty engagement with, and ownership of, the technologies of qualitative
assessment is a major task, but now that I have constructed at least a rudimentary map of the
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terrain, further research into how to most effectively accomplish this objective should have a
reliable model and direction upon which to build.
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Appendix A

INFORMATION SHEET AND
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM
Information about a Dissertation Research Study
Title: Improving Qualitative Assessment in Higher Education
Investigator
Chad W. Russell
Department of Leadership and Counselor
Education
120 Guyton Hall
The University of Mississippi
(662) 236-4020
crussell@olemiss.edu

Dissertation Chair
Lori A. Wolff, Ph.D., J.D.
Department of Leadership and Counselor
Education
139 Guyton Hall
The University of Mississippi
(662) 915-5791
lawolff@olemiss.edu

Description
We seek to identify and understand best practices in qualitative assessment within higher
education. Specifically, we want to investigate the professional experiences and perspectives of
educators and administrators who report, or are reported to have had, successful and/or valuable
experiences in the innovation and/or application of qualitative assessment methods and
methodologies in higher education contexts.
In order to investigate this issue, we are inviting you to take part in the research. Your voluntary
participation would consist of a guided interview to both describe and explore the meaning of
your experience(s) with qualitative assessment. The interview will consist of some initial, prewritten questions to frame your experience within the same general context as that of other
interviewees, and then some open-ended follow-up questions to give you an opportunity to
provide further details as you may think are relevant. A list of the pre-written interview questions
can be provided prior to the interview, if you request it. Ask us, at any point, if there is anything
about this research that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take the time to
decide whether or not you wish to take part.
Risks and Benefits
You will be interviewed in your professional capacity as an educator and/or an administrator,
and therefore may expect and enjoy an appropriate degree of academic freedom in your
response. You may be identified not only by name, but also by institutional title and position in
the published research, which may be a risk or a benefit, depending on your perspective.
Cost and Payments
The basic interview should last no more than 30 minutes; the length of any open-ended followup elaborations will be determined by the mutual consent of both you and the interviewer.
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Participation in this study is a purely voluntary service, and will be without particular
remuneration.
Confidentiality
You may be identified by name, title, and position, as appropriate, in the published research. The
recording of your interview will remain the personal property of the investigator, but the
transcript of the interview (annotated, coded, or otherwise) may be published as an appendix to
the dissertation. If you request confidentiality at any point or on any issue, the request will be
respected, but this may limit the usefulness of your responses to the research.
Right to Withdraw
You do not have to take part in this study. If you start the study and decide that you do not want
to finish, all you have to do is to tell Chad Russell (or Lori Wolff) in person, by letter, by e-mail,
or by telephone at the Department of Leadership and Counselor Education, 120 Guyton Hall,
The University of Mississippi, University MS 38677, or (662) 236-4020. You may withdraw
from this study at any time prior to its acceptance for publication at no penalty. The interview
data of participants who withdraw will not be published nor shared with third parties, and it will
be destroyed at the conclusion of the investigation.
The researchers may terminate your participation in the study without regard to your consent and
for any reason, such as protecting your safety and protecting the integrity of the research data.
IRB Approval
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB). The IRB has determined that this study fulfills the human research subject protections
obligations required by state and federal law and University policies. If you have any questions,
concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at
(662) 915-7482, regarding Ole Miss IRB protocol 11-120.
Statement of Consent
I have read the above information. I have been given a copy of this form. I have had an
opportunity to ask questions, and I have received answers. I consent to participate in the study,
and to have the information I provide published as part of the dissertation research.

Signature of Participant
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Appendix B
Initial Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews — Protocol for Questions
(Designed for use in face-to-face, telephonic, and correspondence interview formats.)

[Begin with noting the time, date, place, and purpose of interview. Identify self and purpose of
interview, including specific qualitative assessment method being investigated. Identify and
thank interviewee.]
1. For the record and in your own words, please state your name and position/title.
1a. What is your background in assessment?
2. What can you tell me about [qualitative assessment program/instrument/experience being
investigated] in general?
2a. How did it and/or its use come about?
2a1. Why was the purpose behind implementing it?
2b. What was/is your involvement with it?
2c. What were the results/outcomes of it?
2c1. Was it a one-time trial, or is it ongoing, and why?
2c2. Has it been modified or replaced, and why?
2d. What was/is the value of it?
2d1. To your institution?
2d2. To your program/division?
2d3. To your colleagues?
2d4. To the students?
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3. What is your professional opinion of [program/instrument/experience] as a method of
qualitative assessment?
3a. Do your colleagues share this opinion, or not?
3b. What sort of feedback did you receive?
3b1. From colleagues?
3b2. From students?
3b3. From accreditors?
4. What do you think of qualitative assessment both in and of itself, and in contrast to
quantitative assessment?
4a. What is the purpose of assessment?
4a1. For educators?
4a2. For institutions?
4a3. For students?
4a4. For other stakeholders?
4b. How would you characterize the difference(s) between qualitative and quantitative
assessment in meeting these goals?
5. What was/is the most important thing gained from your experience with [qualitative
assessment program/instrument/experience]? [Open-ended; may require follow-up.]
5a. Is there anything else about the history, design, features, and/or outcomes of your
experience that you would like to mention or elaborate upon? [Open-ended; may require followup.]
6. What recommendations do you have, or did your institution generate, as a result of using this
particular qualitative assessment? [Particularly open-ended; may require extensive follow-up.]
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7. Is there anything else you would like to add that you think is relevant to the research? [Openended; may require follow-up.]
[Thank interviewee, note time.]
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Appendix C
The following is an essay question response written by Les Perelman and awarded a top
grade of 6 by e-Rater, the automated grader developed by ETS. This is believed to be a verbatim
transcription of a timed-writing original, and any typographic errors – unintentional or otherwise
– are therefore preserved here.

Question: “The rising cost of a college education is the fault of students who demand
that colleges offer students luxuries unheard of by earlier generations of college students—single
dorm rooms, private bathrooms, gourmet meals, etc.”
Discuss the extent to which you agree or disagree with this opinion. Support your views
with specific reasons and examples from your own experience, observations, or reading.

Response: In today’s society, college is ambiguous. We need it to live, but we also need
it to love. Moreover, without college most of the world’s learning would be egregious. College,
however, has myriad costs. One of the most important issues facing the world is how to reduce
college costs. Some have argued that college costs are due to the luxuries students now expect.
Others have argued that the costs are a result of athletics. In reality, high college costs are the
result of excessive pay for teaching assistants.
I live in a luxury dorm. In reality, it costs no more than rat infested rooms at a Motel Six.
The best minds of my generation were destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked, and
publishing obscene odes on the windows of the skull. Luxury dorms pay for themselves because
they generate thousand and thousands of dollars of revenue. In the Middle Ages, the University
of Paris grew because it provided comfortable accommodations for each of its students, large
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rooms with servants and legs of mutton. Although they are expensive, these rooms are necessary
to learning. The second reason for the five-paragraph theme is that it makes you focus on a single
topic. Some people start writing on the usual topic, like TV commercials, and they wind up all
over the place, talking about where TV came from or capitalism or health foods or whatever. But
with only five paragraphs and one topic you’re not tempted to get beyond your original idea, like
commercials are a good source of information about products. You give your three examples,
and zap! you’re done. This is another way the five-paragraph theme keeps you from thinking too
much.
Teaching assistants are paid an excessive amount of money. The average teaching
assistant makes six times as much money as college presidents. In addition, they often receive a
plethora of extra benefits such as private jets, vacations in the south seas, a staring roles in
motion pictures. Moreover, in the Dickens novel Great Expectation, Pip makes his fortune by
being a teaching assistant. It doesn’t matter what the subject is, since there are three parts to
everything you can think of. If you can’t think of more than two, you just have to think harder or
come up with something that might fit. An example will often work, like the three causes of the
Civil War or abortion or reasons why the ridiculous twenty-one-year-old limit for drinking
alcohol should be abolished. A worse problem is when you wind up with more than three
subtopics, since sometimes you want to talk about all of them.
There are three main reasons while Teaching Assistants receive such high remuneration.
First, they have the most powerful union in the United States. Their union is greater than the
Teamsters or Freemasons, although it is slightly smaller than the international secret society of
the Jedi Knights. Second, most teaching assistants have political connections, from being
children of judges and governors to being the brothers and sisters of kings and princes. In Heart
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of Darkness, Mr. Kurtz is a teaching assistant because of his connections, and he ruins all the
universities that employ him. Finally, teaching assistants are able to exercise mind control over
the rest of the university community. The last reason to write this way is the most important.
Once you have it down, you can use it for practically anything. Does God exist? Well, you can
say yes and give three reasons, or no and give three different reasons. It doesn’t really matter.
You’re sure to get a good grade whatever you pick to put into the formula. And that’s the real
reason for education, to get those good grades without thinking too much and using up too much
time.
In conclusion, as Oscar Wilde said, “I can resist everything except temptation.” Luxury
dorms are not the problem. The problem is greedy teaching assistants. It gives me an
organizational scheme that looks like an essay, it limits my focus to one topic and three subtopics
so I don’t wander about thinking irrelevant thoughts, and it will be useful for whatever writing I
do in any subject.1 I don’t know why some teachers seem to dislike it so much. They must have
a different idea about education than I do.
By Les Perelman
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